February 1, 1979. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s fourteen year exile was finally coming to an end. From Neauphle-le-Château where he had spent only a few months after being kicked out of Najaf by Saddam Hussein (accounts differ on the Shah’s role in this) he had chartered an Air France 747 and was finally entering Iranian airspace. On board were a cadre of Western journalists, including Newsweek’s Elaine Sciolino, who wrote of this exchange between ABC’s Peter Jennings and Ayatollah Khomeini in her book, Persian Mirrors:

“Ayatollah, would you be so kind as to tell us how you feel about being back in Iran?”

“Hichi,” the ayatollah replied. “Nothing.”

“Hichi?” Ghotbzadeh asked him. Even he seemed incredulous at the response.

“Hich ehsasi nadaram,” the ayatollah said for emphasis. “I don’t feel a thing.”

While stoicism is characteristic of a mojtahed of his rank, this laconic reply has nonetheless been the subject of  debate and speculation to this day. (Unbeknownst to me at the drafting of this writing, someone thought of the same opening for their short piece. So, I’ll briefly add that Elaine Sciolino says Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, Khomeini’s aide and translator, innocently flirted with her).

A month earlier, after losing several close confidants and seeing the tide of history mounting against his crumbling regime’s edifice, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi announced the decision to name long time opposition National Front politician, Shapour Bakhtiar as Prime Minister and invited him to form a new government. It was a desperate concession of an autocratic monarch in failing health to salvage his dynasty.

Prime Minister Bakhtiar promised to disband SAVAK, relax martial law, and did lift restrictions on the press and free political prisoners and further promised to hold free elections and determine the future of the monarchy. On the 16th of January, Bakhtiar convinced the Shah to go on holiday. The Shah would never see Iran again; and with him, 2,500 years of royalty was banished. Yet all this was for naught. Too little, too late. And all was made moot by his most fateful mistake: relenting in allowing Khomeini’s plane to land at Mehrabad Airport. After arriving, Khomeini went to Behesht-e Zahra cemetery (sort of like a mix of Père-Lachaise and Arlington) to honor martyrs whom had lost their lives in confrontations with the Shah’s security forces. In a speech before a large crowd there, he vowed to “smash in the mouth of the Bakhtiar government.”

Four days later, Ayatollah Khomeini declared technocrat, Mehdi Bazargan, as the “true” Prime Minister of a provisional government. Of Bakhtiar, Khomeini said in a radio address, “Why do you talk of the Shah, Mossadegh, money? These have already passed. Islam is all that remains” (without any sense of irony that Bazargan was also an admirer and former public servant of Mossadegh). The demonstrators on the streets chanted to effect that Bakhtiar was a servant with no power. They were right. He had alienated both the most loyal military royalists and his erstwhile revolutionary comrades, whom had expelled him from the National Front as a traitor for dealing with the Shah.

To this day some in the Iranian diaspora bemoan President Carter for not supporting Bakhtiar more; but I have doubts there was anything to be done, and fear much of this is emotion (though understandable). On the 4th of January, General Robert “Dutch” Huyser had been dispatched to Tehran. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski had advocated a coup (I know, right?!). In the weeks he was there, General Huyser concluded and reported back that with troops peeling off at nearly a 1,ooo a day to desertion and defection and the officer corps divided, no such military reassertion of power was practicable.

The evening of February 9, Bakhtiar decided to air the Peter Jenning’s interview to discredit Khomeini. It backfired. At Doshan Tappeh Air Base, southeast of Tehran, Homafars (Air Force cadets and technicians) rebelled. Word reached the Feda’iyan and Mojahedin guerrillas, whom helped fend off the Imperial Guards. After this routing, Tehran became a war zone and the next two days were spent opening up armories and prisons, and overtaking police stations and military bases in Tehran and provinces. There were over two-hundred casualties. At two p.m. General Abbas Gharabaghi declared the Army’s neutrality and they pulled back to their barracks. Around four hours later the national radio station was seized and the victory of the Revolution declared, “in sedaye enghelab-e mardom-e Iran ast” (this is the voice of the Revolution). It was 22 Bahman 1357, the day which would be in symbolism the “4th of July” of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

22 Bahman 1388. Thirty-one years later, this celebration would also occur eight months after protests first erupted in the wake of the contested reëlection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Since the Ashoura protests, the pressure and preparation had been mounting from the security forces and hardline politicians, with principlists issuing similar warnings to lesser and varying degrees; executions, rounding up and detaining opposition, etc. Much of this I outlined in my previous article and won’t go into much depth again here. Although Jason Shams did an excellent summation on the government’s gearing-up,

It tries to deny our existence in the provinces far from the cities, with oil dollars, Chinese tear gas, and Russian hackers helping make the point; telephones are tapped, activists imprisoned, a stroll down the street and we are faced with gangs of Basij and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iranians can watch MTV and pornography on satellite television, but the BBC and Voice of America have been jammed. The Internet has been reduced to a trickle, newspapers shut down.

Many in the diaspora were hyping this up to be the last stand. Even Reza Aslan miscalculated. I demur that I may have not made this clear, but I had my skepticism and worry and generally agreed in tone with Geneive Abdo’s prediction. Of all days on the Iranian calendar, the government was not about to be humiliated on this day of all politically charged days. The Greens also risked being too easily  branded counterrevolutionaries. In the weeks that have followed, it has been difficult for me to figure out just what transpired that day in confirmed protests in Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, Mashhad and Ahvaz (see videos). Ali Arouzi, reporting for NBC, says he was transported straight from his bureau to Azadi Square for Ahmadinejad’s speech, not allowed to talk to even pro-Government supporters, and driven straight back. Other journalists gave the same account.

So what really happened? I still don’t know. I would agree with Scott Lucas at Enduring America though, that “The Regime Won Ugly“,

There was nothing hopeful in the rows of security forces who, having been prepared after the humiliations of Ashura, were not going to countenance another retreat. There was nothing of glory or Islamic value in the confrontations with Mehdi Karroubi (wounded, his son missing), Zahra Rahnavard (beaten), Mohammad Khatami and Mir Hossein Mousavi (forced into retreat), let alone the thousands of encounters in which chains, batons, and flying-squad detentions trumped hope and determination.

Muhammad Sahimi from Tehran Bureau, added his own positive spin,

First, the very fact that on the thirty-first anniversary of the Revolution, the hardliners had to saturate Tehran and other large cities with security forces just to prevent peaceful demonstrations by the opposition represents a significant victory for Green supporters. This is the day when the people are supposed to come out freely and celebrate the establishment of the political system that the hardliners claim they support, and yet there was an unofficial state of emergency, with tens of thousands of security forces patrolling the streets.

While I wouldn’t call it a “victory” for the Greens (maybe a tactical retreat, at best), this all, of course, make the Leveretts jump for joy. I and other Green sympathizers are often chided to go and join those in Iran. I shoot back that the armchair Basiji fan club have no place telling us that. I’ve been to pro-Green demonstrations here in the states. Maybe for them to show solidarity they could come at us with tear gas and crack a few of our skulls; or take pictures, track us down, and intimidate our friends and family?

As Mir Hossein Mousavi recently said in his first comments since 22 Bahman on February 28th, “this year’s rally was engineered” and,

The green movement missed a historic chance because the regime eclipsed its presence,” he said. “However, it was much more harmful to the regime than the movement because covering up the reality will never result in [the movement’s] elimination. I’m sure that this massive crackdown will deepen and broaden the movement.

Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohammad Khatami were prevented from joining protests, or for only a brief time. Khatami’s brother, Mohammad Reza Khatami and his wife Zahra Eshraghi, the granddaughter of Ayatollah Khomeini, were detained then released after trying to join protests. Mehdi Karroubi’s car was again attacked and he is reported to have shed blood. Karroubi’s son, Ali, was allegedly beaten in a mosque after trying to protect his father, whose security detail never showed. His other son, Hossein Karroubi gave an interview expanding upon that here. Further, there was word of shots fired in Sadeghiyeh Square north of Azadi Square, where opposition was to meet, but whose numbers were disappointing.

IRIB, the official media organ of the Islamic Republic broadcast this helicopter footage. The original did not, of course, have that pro-government hip-hop, which struck me in similarity to this techno infused Mousavi campaign song. In any case, most rap is banned, especially under Ahmadinejad, so forgive me if I roll my eyes at that. State media also reported the day saw fifty million regime supporters demonstrate according to this live-blog. Iran’s population is approximately seventy million. If I were to define this day as celebrating the overthrow of the Shah or just enjoying a picnic with family and friends, well, that’s not hard to believe. I don’t think that was the expressed intent nor implication though.

From the Green sites now. A video with text commentary, from inside Azadi Square during Ahmadinejad’s speech. There are several significant things in it, including a man sitting on a picture of Supreme Leader Khamene’i and at the end, the Coat of Arms of the IRI, is cut out of a flag and on the ground. Most notably, this (zoom) satellite image went viral:

It was taken when Ahmadinejad was giving his speech, as seen on state television. Compare camera angle there with the picture above. Pro-government supporters contest that these are doctored (by the usual suspects: Hypocrites, Monarchists, Zionists and American Imperialists, of course). This rings hollow with me from those whom cite IRIB and post their own videos with Persian rap, though. A dose of skepticism is always healthy, on both sides. But having said that, IRIB and IRINN’s coverage was suspect most notably in one regard. No live sound. Instead, they played patriotic songs, and their “live” coverage was very canned. This was reported by more than one observer, but Pedestrian gives the most entertaining account (if I can even use the ‘e’ word regarding state propaganda).

Setting up loudspeakers to drown out any eghteshahgar, “attention seekers creating disturbance”, doesn’t match up with a secure government who brushes off the opposition as marginal elements, with decreasing numbers due to “radicalization” (which is admittedly a worry to keeping broad support on the streets, and not confined behind proverbial Persian Walls). Numerous accounts abound of security forces searching people for any green contraband or cell phones and rounding them up into alleys and whisked away. Truth is, there is no telling how many opposition supporters actually made it in and around Azadi Square, and any guesses one way or the other is mere speculation.

There is also the possibility, that given the five day weekend this year, that many more affluent went to Dizin (a ski resort) or the Caspian coast. Of course, there are class undertones in these assertions, but they are not altogether untrue. On the other side, were pictures such as these:

These are the infamous buses the government uses to bring in pro-Ahmadinejad and otherwise conservative supporters to regime rallies and events in Tehran from outlying villages. These supporters are what are pejoratively referred to as sandis. The term comes from a fruit drink handed out to regime supporters by Pasdars and others. The condescending implication here is sometimes that they are poor and are bribed to come to these events with a lunch and drink. Aside from the appeal of a free meal, I would say that’s the wrong way to look at it. This hospitality is common to the Middle East, and Iran is no exception! Except for the fact that while the so-called sandis get refreshments, anyone with green gets a beating (or worse).

Ahmadinejad’s ramp up to this day was full of talking about sanctions, nuclear rights and a failed rocket launch into space. Some speculate that this focus on issues that unify all Iranians could have had an impact in softening opposition. His speech, replete with a rocket centerpiece (paging Dr. Freud), had little of substance. Blame Israel, blame America, blame MeK, and cartoonish gholov (braggadocio), yada yada. He also declared Iran a “nuclear state” boasting they’d reached capability to enrich uranium to medical isotope levels of 20%. Funny thing though, they appear to be having trouble with this. Even Robert Gibbs said that,

“The Iranian nuclear program has undergone a series of problems throughout the year. We do not believe they have the capability to enrich to the degree to which they now say they are enriching.”

For once, when not complicit in manufacturing cable news hysteria and pandering to AIPAC & Co. hawks, the White House had a moment of honesty which was in line with such differing experts as David Albright, Flynt Leverett and Reza Aslan on PBS Newshour, during which Reza Aslan said,

But we have to under — we have to recognize that the statement that Iran is going to start enriching uranium at 20 percent, that it’s going to build 10 more enrichment plants in the next year, are, frankly, laughable. I mean, it took Iran years to build its one site in Natanz. It can barely keep that up and running.

So, this is not just for domestic consumption, but, more importantly, it’s designed to get a response from the West, because, if there’s one thing that all people in Iran, despite their politics or piety, whether in the Green Movement or the pro-government movement, agree on is Iran’s inalienable right to enrich uranium.

Of course, the cable news networks seized upon the “nuclear state” headline like addicts to a crack pipe. Rudi Bakhtiar, former CNN and FOX News anchor now with the Public Affairs Alliance of  Iranian Americans (and niece of Shapour Bakhtiar) being interviewed on CNN called out their coverage and said what I have said so many times. In so many words, she basically accused CNN and other networks of collaborating with Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad counts on this response, and instead of keeping the focus on the Green Movement and human rights, they take the bait every time, and muddle the message. I almost stood up and clapped when I saw her do this.

The “Green defeat” analyses have been endless. Juan Cole is included in those that were blunt about it. The government seems to have finally caught up to the calendar battle, and the asset of online social networking and SMS communication has become a liability through monitoring and phone tapping (though this has been overblown, as word still spreads like fire the old fashioned way from alley to alley). This includes exiles like former regime insider Mohsen Sazegara publishing detailed protest routes; and, Karroubi calling to meet at Sadheghiyeh Square and march towards Azadi Square. Security forces just had to close off such routes and again prevent the opposition from forming any large group. From here on, broadcasting rallying points and plans has to be reëxamined and alternatives found.

On the eve of 22 Bahman, amid sporadic Allah-o Akbars (view World Press Photo of 2009), Hashemi Rafsanjani leaked a letter on his personal website which he had sent leader Khamene’i before the June ‘09 election day. In it he warned of Ahmadinejad’s lies (most likely referencing presidential debates, which hearken back to the 2005 presidential election), and against potential election fraud. Before moving forward, I’d like to take a brief excursion back to over a dozen years ago.

On May 16, 1997, a week before election day, delivering his sermon at Tehran University Friday Prayers, Rafsanjani warned, “treachery is an unforgivable act, and I do not consider any sin greater than someone giving himself the right to rig the votes of the people.” Goaded by Rafsanjani, Khamene’i assured a free and fair poll. The following needs to be quoted in full, from Geneive Abdo and Jonothan Lyon’s 2003 book, Answering Only to God,

But Khatami and his aides were well aware that pressure was mounting steadily on President Rafsanjani and the leader to prevent him from winning a clear majority in the first round. They worried that a second round would allow plenty of time for dirty tricks, sabotage, or even a coup by hard-liners in the Revolutionary Guards and their volunteer auxiliary, the basij. If the establishment were ever tempted to defraud the voters, then this was surely the moment; the threat from Khatami to the social, political, and theological order that had settled over the country since the revolution appeared simply too great.

These Khatami aides telephoned Rafsanjani to ensure the integrity of the count on election day. His daughter, Faezeh, arrived at the Interior Ministry with a retinue of armed security to ensure no shenanigans (though this could be interpreted as one in itself, she can handle herself. Watch this recent verbal confrontation with Basijis where she is cornered). In elections, while counts are taken locally, a second counting is undertaken when they are collected at the Interior Ministry (which does not have to match up with the first form’s tally). Before this year’s count, there were allegations from officials in the ministry warning of the possibility of tampering and pointing to a supposed fatwa from Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, Ahmadinejad’s spiritual advisor and member of the Assembly of Experts, that rigging the vote was okay for the greater good of preserving the Islamic system (this would correspond to rumors that he is part of the Hojjatieh, an anti-democratic “C Street”, it might be put).

The Interior Ministry’s count is then validated by the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council is notoriously conservative. It is made up of six clerics, appointed by the Supreme Leader, and six jurists, nominated by the Head of the Judiciary, who is himself appointed by the Supreme Leader. Notice a pattern here? (It is also the Guardian Council which selects candidates in the first place.) To claim that their recount was impartial begs incredulity; quis custodiet ipso custodes? And, finally, the Supreme Leader can nullify the results. Mohsen Reza’i, then still Chief Commander of the Pasdaran had hinted in 1997 he was prepared to crush an uprising should Khamene’i have asserted this power.

This past election, as a candidate himself, Reza’i expressed initial doubt over the election results. An additional irony to all this is that I am not one of those convinced Ahmadinejad necessarily couldn’t have actually won. The institutional power and stacking of provincial power and influence in the Interior Ministry involved in administering elections did nothing to engender confidence though. Nor did the clumsy handling of election announcements. Any ‘Zionist instigation and sowing of doubt’ would frankly be redundant, and those claiming this is part of the imperialist MSM demonizing the IRI need to do their homework to disabuse themselves of this adolescent reductionism. Correcting all these institutional inequities in the system constitutionally have been core planks of the Reform platform since its inception, as the name would imply.

What now though? Questioning the election results are now regarded as a “sin” by Khamene’i and hardliners. Even conservative foes like MP Ali Motahari, opposed to Ahmadinejad have suggested Mousavi drop this issue and stop protests altogether, additional overtures of allying against Ahmedinejad and addressing compromised solutions to the problems, blaming both sides of stubbornness. This, of course, would remove leverage which Mousavi gets from the streets. Also to be taken into account is the eternal pragmatist, Rafsanjani, who in his recent praises of the Supreme Leader and condemnation of “sedition” cast a little worry, though one must consider the art of Persian riddle talk that I’ve mentioned before. It may be triangulating, hedging and deal making behind-the-scenes to be read here. It is widely assumed that Rafsanjani still covets the title of Supreme Leader for himself. Ousting Khamene’i via the powers invested to the Assembly of Experts, which Rafsanjani chairs, is not happening. Rafsanjani is playing his own game, where the opposition serves not only his more moderate positions, but perhaps more importantly, his own ambition. Mousavi is still safe, and Rafsanjani’s fingerprint can be assumed in that circumstance.

My humble advice would be to sideline the election issue, as Mousavi has done, and focus on the human rights and constitutional violations of the past eight months. There is plenty of material to work off of here, as outlined in this lengthy Iran Human Rights Documentation Center Report, “Violent Aftermath: The 2009 Election and Suppression of Dissent in Iran” (PDF). Just recently, this video from June 15th, thought to be leaked, came out capturing a Tehran University dormitory raid (one can only wonder what may come out in months and years to come). Regime defenders are more comfortable debating numbers and math, rather than blood. Even the now ubiquitous, “I didn’t vote for Ahmadinejad, but…” posters on the internet (taking a cue from arch-apologist and Leverett BFF, Tehran University professor, Dr. Mohammad Marandi) try to compare riot control tactics of the West and Iran, or Iran under the Shah. The crackdown isn’t as brutal as under the Shah, and therefore this isn’t a real movement (only they use the straw man of “revolution”), goes the line of reasoning. How facile! You think veterans of the ‘79 Revolution don’t know what affect a public massacre like Black Friday has?!  The riot comparisons can be interesting, though, and I take note of the valuable perspective. But stretched too far and ignoring the broader societal context can take it to levels ad absurdum. Kent State, Seattle 1999 and G20 crackdowns of free assembly are not to be celebrated, and the deflection employed by the IRI hardly lives up to their utopian boasting. What are they trying to say? That they’re Western-lite and still backwards in their repression? In addition, we’re not talking about sound cannons here, and the backdrop is of a much more authoritarian state apparatus. Patriot Act? eat your heart out. Freedom of Information Act? …Hold on, let me stop laughing. Sorry, but no, it’s not the same thing.

One of the more interesting articles on riot tactics compares 2009 Iran with 1960’s America. This suits me just fine, as my contention is not to think of this movement as about sore losers, but the election as a spark for a long simmering civil rights struggle and shifting demographics of the Children of the Revolution, as Hamid Dabashi contends in his series of webcasts, “This Week in Green,” and as was written in an article by Ian Morrison, “An Iranian Civil Rights Movement?” which pivots to economic policy,

Aside from comparisons to the Civil Rights Movement, one finds in the discourse on Iran a great deal of squabbling about the class character of the Green Movement protesters and what that means for its future. Early on, Ahmadinejad sympathizers heaped scorn on the Green Movement, claiming that protesters were all from the affluent neighborhoods of northern Tehran. This account is parochial at best; while nobody has contested that people from northern Tehran participated in various demonstrations, the Green Movement has an amorphous and complex makeup that belies easy classification along the lines of this or that political allegiance, especially given the suffocating repression of the Iranian state. Calling the demonstrations “middle class,” as though this alone amounts to a “political analysis,” circumvents any consideration of the potential for working class and labor issues to be taken up by the movement over time.

Indeed, when discussing where the movement goes from here, everyone looking back to the years of 1978-1979, look to the crucial aspect which organized labor played through strikes. Ian Morrison previously did a piece entitled “Iran’s New Labor?“, an interview with trade unionist, Homayoun Pourzad, who described Ahmadinejad as “profoundly anti-Left and anti-working class.” Four labor organizations listed ten minimal demands before 22 Bahman with the reminder that,

A nationwide strike lead by workers at the National Oil Company, the vanguard of the Iranian working class, shut down oil pipelines, ultimately tearing the despotic regime asunder. Masses of people chanted, “Our oil workers! Our resolute leader!” Power fell to the people.

This is a not so subtle reminder of the Left’s crucial role in overthrowing the Shah. On February 19th, 600 workers at Bandar-e Abbas went on strike for a common complain: unpaid back wages. Other strikes can be found in Hamid Farokhnia’s “Ahmadinejad’s import mania” which has this passage full of symbolism,

Today, even women’s traditional attire like chador comes from abroad, all government agencies have been instructed to use imported food staples for employees’ meals, and many Chinese goods are cheaper in Iran than anywhere in the world outside China itself. No wonder domestic producers can no longer effectively compete with the flood of foreign goods.

Ahmadinejad is importing to offset inflation and benefits from an artificially high exchange rate for the rial. As such, the article points out only 9% of tea is domestically produced (Iranians take great pride in their tea), and over the past four years sugar production has been halved. Such hard numbers are hard to come by, though, to substantiate this, and economics generally makes my eyes glaze over. The article’s title of “import mania” though, is a reference to the same phenomenon of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in the 60’s and 70’s. One should be aware of trying to draw too many conclusions in attempts to make comparisons for an agenda. It doesn’t make it untrue though. It would also explain what jumped off of my computer screen as a stretch when I read Reza Aslan’s review of 22 Bahman,

If the mullahs and the merchants begin joining forces with the protesters, even as the Revolutionary Guard becomes more entrenched in the political sphere, a civil war may be inescapable.

While I’d ask Reza to watch it with loaded talk of civil war (his track record is still pretty good though), he points to an article by Jamsheed K. Choksy about Ahmadinejad moving more from the clerics and doing triangulating of his own. Ahmadinejad is a maverick, and shrewd politician, whom has cultivated real appeal to a good segment of Iranians. From Choksy’s Newsweek article,

As a result, together with the IRGC and Basij (a volunteer paramilitary group that has attacked opposition protesters), Ahmadinejad and his ilk are turning to totalitarianism, rather than the fundamentalism of Shiite clerics, to suppress the steadily growing democratic aspirations of the Green Movement. Yet the mullahs have strong allies too, not only in the legislature, led by Ali Larijani (who hails from a family of well-known clerics), but even among the president’s own clan, whose members remain divided on abjuring theocracy.

I realize I’ll need to decode all this economic factionalism. Let me try to piece this together. As Nikki R. Keddie put it in Roots of Revolution,

Governmental favoring of nonbazaar trade and industry and various plans of “modernization” or dispersal of the bazaar … were partly designed to weaken the bazaar’s politico-economic cohesion.

That was during Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s reign. Now consider the following from Robert Baer’s The Devil We Know in light of Ahmadinejad’s “import mania”,

[T]he Revolutionary Guards are, in a sense, a state within a state. They own more than a hundred companies and control as much as $12 billion, possibly more, in assets.

Reza Aslan contends that it was part of the Obama Administration’s strategy, in targeting the Pasdaran (which may control as much as a third of Iran’s economy) in sanctions, to send a message to bazaaris (traditional merchant class). The bazaari-ulema (merchant-clerical) relationship is deep, their networks complex, and go back centuries. Along with the intellectual-professional class and labor on the Left they formed the indispensable Right flank that brought down the Shah. Clerics often come from the bazaari class, and mosques are often situated in or near bazaars at the heart of a city.

The bazaari-ulema constituency is most often associated with the principlist conservatives like Speaker of the Majles Ali Larijani or commercial pragmatists like Rafsanjani. The first general bazaar strike since the Revolution occurred in 2008 in response to a proposed tax by Ahmadinejad. Taken all together, Aslan’s view is a good angle to take on deciphering the purpose of these new sanctions. Because, other than appeasing AIPAC and hawks in both the Republican and Democratic parties who want to “be tough” on Iran for domestic consumption (even if only with empty and counterproductive measures), the sanctions will likely have minimal effect on an organization which operates significantly like a mafia; on the black market. However; even if words of Treasury Undersecretary Stuart Levey (whom Press TV always subtly has a prominent picture of) to the effect of helping ordinary businessmen over a “select group of insiders” never makes it past the filter of Iranian state media (unlike Secretary of State Clinton’s “military dictatorship” comment and Iran’s response), at least Obama’s policy team is sophisticated enough to get the internal dynamics of Iran when they’re not concurrently pursuing the same old failed Washington-Tel Aviv-Riyadh line. As Shirin Ebadi suggested, sanctions on Siemens Nokia Networks would also be appropriate, even if sanctioning a Finno-Germanic venture is less palatable to US lawmakers.

Of course, Newt Gingrich compares the policy of the Obama Administration to the appeasement of Hitler. If anyone is Neville Chamberlain, it is George W. Bush, who created the political vacuum with which Iran could implement the Lebanon model of proxies and utilize long established Shi’a political allies (many who were exiled in Iran under Saddam). The upcoming Iraqi elections will be a good measure of the level of their success in effectively annexing the chunks of the country in all but name. In any case, Newt, take it up with Iranian-Americans, who in a PAAIA poll conducted by Zogby International, approve for the most part of Obama’s tact.

My cautionary take in regard to the bazaari-ulema class is to see it through the prism of parliamentary factional maneuvering and not to put too much hope in a general strike, and certainly not in them joining the ranks of the Green Movement (at least not any time soon). Such is reminiscent of speculation that the Artesh (regular army) might step in in the height of the summer protests. To their credit, they have remained professional and neutral, honoring Khomeini’s injunction on the armed forces (unlike the Pasdaran).

In any case, aside from fundamental sociological factors, looking back upon the ‘79 Revolution, which 22 Bahman commemorated, as a blueprint for another revolution is specious. What the Green Movement represents, officially, is a simple aspiration for there to be respect of a plurality of opinion and civil society within the framework of the Islamic Republic. This is expounded by Mousavi in his most recent interview published on his personal site, Kaleme. While pointing out that bussing in supporters was done by the Shah among other repressive tactics, the headline was when Mousavi stated that “[t]his is the rule of a cult that has hijacked the concept of Iranianism and nationalism.” I would highly recommend reading the full translation.

He also echoed Karroubi’s request that dueling rallies be allowed (I even recall the suggestion that they could be held outside the city) and a referendum on the Guardian Council’s role in future elections. The translation cites Art. 54, but I believe it is Art. 59. This would mean going through Art. 177 to change Art. 99, if I am not mistaken. That requires going through Khamene’i, Ahmadinejad and the Expediency Council after which, a Council for Revision will be formed (which is required to consist of members of the Guardian Council itself, among representatives from every other key institution and branch of government) to discuss the proposal. Then, the Supreme Leader approves of the referendum, to be put to the people to vote on (how many problems could you count in that formula?). This was only done once before in 1989, at the behest of Khomeini, who tailored it to his successor who had neither the charisma, following, nor religious credentials he had. Members of that council included Karroubi and Mousavi. They are posturing here. They know full-well the hurdles and equilibrium of power is decidedly set against them. But, so do those whom identify with the Green Movement. Maybe the task here, with this specific goal, is to unify the movement in pressuring the Supreme Leader to entertain it or implicitly highlight the faults in the current system to the most ardent and apathetic alike and mobilize them around a coherent message.

As to the Supreme Leader jettisoning Ahmadinejad, in what was from the start of his first election, an awkward alliance, I would ask this: can he afford to do this without further risking the legitimacy of his own position? It would be tantamount to a concession and desperation mirroring Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s scapegoating of Prime Minister Hoveyda in 1977. It would be possible, I suppose, to hold Ahmadinejad in breach of Art. 113, stating that the president must be held to uphold and protect the constitution, and under Art. 130 “voluntarily” issue his resignation. But, since elections are “divine tests” of Allah’s will, and the Supreme Leader is Allah’s proxy on earth who already validated the election, how could he pull this off? And, more importantly, is the Supreme Leader really in complete control anymore? It goes to the core of the inherent contradictions of a Theocratic Republic, which is critiqued at length by Islamic scholars such as Mohsen Kadivar, and bemoaned with sad regret by the writers of the original draft constitution from the liberal Freedom Movement like Nasser Katouzian, whom had their work mangled and the exaltation of the position of Vali-ye Faghih enshrined beyond symbolic mediator and into a turbaned shah. I have a pet theory on why since Banisadr, no president has ever lost reëlection, but it’s more of the musing category, and I don’t really feel comfortable sharing it in this piece. There are also other perfectly reasonable explanations regarding state media and elections being personality-driven.

But, if the opposition’s goals seem doomed, then what does that leave us with? On CNN Newsroom, Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment and Trita Parsi of the National Iranian-American Council were interviewed by Don Lemon (for a humorous look at this pairing read this!). Trita Parsi made this point,

And the mere fact the game continues is in and of itself a defeat for the government because eight months, nine months after the fraud in elections this is still going on. Sometimes demonstrations are bigger, sometimes they’re smaller. But any sense of normalcy the government is yet to be able to find.

With all the talk of disappointment, or squabbling over the true size of the movement, perspective is lost. Even by the most conservative estimates, this is the largest social upheaval and challenge to the institutional establishment of the IRI in certainly twenty years; the length of Khamene’i’s tenure. Larger than the original 18 Tir student protests in 1999 or their commemoration in 2003. Comparisons to anti-war demonstrations starting in the spring of 1985 which intermittently continued until 1988 (when Mousavi was Prime Minister, by the way) as the Iran-Iraq war needlessly dragged on before Khomeini drank the “poison chalice” would be more tenuous. But it would validate Mohsen Kadivar who said in 2000 that, “if more Iranians are willing to suffer, the establishment will have to give in.” Except, in that case the suffering was more immediate and affected everyone. As I said, tenuous comparison, and hardly an analogous circumstance. Although, it sapped the original revolutionary zeal in the public which Ahmadinejad and his coterie of mid-ranking Pasdar allies pledged to restore in 2005.

For additional perspective, one only need look at Mousavi’s history itself, such as in this article from The New Republic by respected scholar of Iran, Abbas Milani; or this one from Tehran Bureau’s Muhammad Sahimi. Who would have thought that Mousavi; a soft-spoken regime insider selected by the Guardian Council to run, would have stood up to his old rival Khamene’i this long? And can they afford to arrest him? Apparently their current line, from an Assembly of Experts’ statement is that the “sedition” is crushed and are more successfully changing the subject yet again with the capture and “confession” of Jundallah leader, Abdolmalek Rigi (this is actually newsworthy, unlike most manufactured distractions). Jundallah is a Sunni Baluchi terrorist group, which has had support from America in the past. Figure out the implied message here. And yet, Mousavi will not be cowed.

In Mousavi’s Kaleme interview on the path forward, he was asked about the floated idea of using Cheharshanbeh Souri, a secular sublimation of the Zoroastrian Jashn-e Sadeh (links of which I included at the bottom of my last article “Keeping the Fire Burning“). It is an evening celebration like Guy Fawkes Night mixed with Halloween. Bonfires are made, and jumped over saying “sorki-ye to az man, zardi-ye man az to” to the fire (your red color is mine, my sallowness is yours). Any reader of the Golden Bough or with any knowledge of similar Indo-European practices will instantly recognize parallels here. In present day Iran, it is one of the few times the sexes can freely interact socially and includes a Persian version of trick-or-treating. It also involves fireworks and has developed a reputation as a night of mischief and tragedy, reminding me of scenes of Devil’s Night in The Crow. Blogger Pedestrian thought it a horrible idea, and Mousavi concurred,

The ritual on this day reminds us of the defeat of darkness by light. But the supporters of the Green Movement, while respecting such national and religious occasions, do not want them to be used to harass and hurt the people, especially since those who oppose the Green Movement may have planned to use the occasion to bring the Movement into disrepute.

However; the grand Iranian holiday which it precludes offers hope. While 22 Bahman commemorated a Revolution which occurred before approximately 70% of the population was even born; Nowrouz, the Persian New Year, will provide a test of the Green Movement’s creativity and vigor, and is more ideal in its timeless ancient symbolism than any revolutionary anniversary.

Robin Wright, interviewed by Council on Foreign Relations,

[There's] the graffiti that is showing up on walls and fences and buildings that berates the regime or calls for a new public demonstration; posters that go up in the dead of night with pictures of political detainees demanding their freedom; and shouts at the subway stations [and] in soccer matches that erupt spontaneously, shouting, “Death to the dictator,” or “Down with Khamenei.” These things are playing out on a daily basis. There is a lot of energy behind this movement, not just on the days that people turn out on the street. It is arguably the most vibrant and imaginative civil disobedience campaign anywhere in the world today.

With more creativity to be seen, hopefully, as in the “wall dialogues” mentioned above (1), (2), or as in the fluidity of Persian Rap:

Ghogha ft. Shahin Najafi -- Enghelab-e Tafakor

As always, my disclaimer. I am not an expert. I do my best to interpret current events in Iran, that is all. Corrections are welcome. And nothing is more appreciated than questions on anything Iran-related (even if you don’t make it through the whole article). To prove I don’t take myself too seriously:

Appendix: BBC’s helpful flow chart on the political system of the IRI to help you follow parts of this article.

The last month in Iran has been full of little clues and a few intrigues. I will try to pare them down. This update has been long coming, and before I become even more overwhelmed, I’ll try to do my best.

The beginning of the Gregorian year, January 1st, 2010, following the Ashura demonstrations, the most violent since summer, Mir Hossein Mousavi issued this statement. This included five primary conditions, giving structure and form to the Green Movement.

1. Accountability for the current Ahmadinejad administration. Real application of the checks and balances of the judiciary and majles as outlined in the Constitution.
2. New election laws, passed by the majles, to ensure lack of interference at all levels of government.
3. Release of all political prisoners.
4. A free media. Letting foreign press report, reopening banned newspapers and ceasing internet censorship and signal jamming.
5. Upholding the peoples right to demonstrate without fear.

As was predictable, Kayhan, the Iranian Pravda, says in a headline (Farsi) that it was written by the CIA and Mossad. Five noted expatriate reform intellectuals issued their own ten demands. I would not put too much importance upon this, though, and offer it merely for your perusal.

On taking stock of the movement the day after the statement, Muhammad Sahimi stresses this “is a Marathon, not a sprint.” That the trio of Mousavi, former President Khatami, and two time Majles Speaker Karroubi, are no longer merely symbolic leaders. Sahimi continued:

Up until recently, the jury was still out on whether the trio truly led the Green Movement. It was particularly unclear whether Mousavi was truly interested in fundamental changes, or even had what it took to stand up for anything. Two important points about Mousavi must be considered. … by all indications, he is recognized by most of the supporters of the Green Movement inside Iran, as well as the hardliners, as the symbol and the leader of the opposition.

The fact that even the reticent Khatami has stepped more into the fray and that Karroubi says that even the shah would not have transgressed Ashura by creating such crimes demonstrates that they are taking their stand, and not backing down half a year into the movement.

The increased pressures, threats and attacks on the offices of heir apparent to Montazeri’s mantle, Grand Ayatollah Sane’i, and Karroubi; in addition to, increasingly empty promises to arrest the three and a full-on crackdown, give all the evidence I need that this is not the meaningless movement the hardliners and their Western apologists here claim. Indeed, this was an interesting article by Borzou Daragahi on the opposition movement in the heartland from the Los Angeles Times and the spread of DVD’s with footage of demonstrations. I, of course, caution against reading such sources with too much confidence in their representative nature. The one fact that we are certain of is that press access is extremely restricted, so wherever one’s sympathies lie, hard information is hard to come by. That is why Iran has become such a contested debate among policy experts and online bloggers alike (*ahem*), with the last line of refuge among apologists often coming down to these polls. My response? I wouldn’t care if they were a few dozen. Even if I were to accept the polls, it is irrelevant to the issue of human rights. That, too, is apparently controversial to the woo-woo. I’ve had more than one scoff at Amnesty International as an organization which is apparently part of the Zionist NWO conspiracy.

On that note, perhaps the highest profile apologists: the Leveretts. In a New York Times op-ed on January 5, they called on Obama to proceed on course, and ignore the Green Movement. In this they also went out of their way to simplify history, distort information, peddle conservative Iranian propaganda and construct straw man after straw man in what seemed like spite for inconvenient internal developments which complicated their pet cause: détente. While I do not entirely disagree with their call to proceed on a vigorous diplomatic track with Iran or their goals of rapprochement regardless of government (Nixon, China and the Cultural Revolution are often brought up to support this view, and indeed, Sen. John Kerry’s request to visit Iran got little notice), I thought that their blithe dismissal of those risking harm for human rights (click here for a recent roundup) was petty and unneeded to make that case. And their construct of arguing against this as an overthrow of the Islamic Republic by the secular elite was unbecoming to experts of their caliber. They often fall into the mire of Western foreign policy debate rather than addressing the situation in Iran directly - though in their follow up to criticisms, they doubled down on their rationalizations and ostensible objectivity. Juan Cole read my mind when he wrote:

Being someone who has spent his life studying Iran, I am of course frustrated by what I see as significant flaws in the debate as conducted by policy thinkers in the NYT. But I have long since concluded that the New York – Washington – Tel Aviv discourse about the Middle East is not about the Middle East but about New York and Washington and Tel Aviv, and that it is virtually impenetrable because it is driven by powerful interests rather than a dispassionate consideration of facts on the ground, a sense of proportionality, and a textured knowledge of the target country (and I do mean target).

Such policy debate is understandable, as this was the motivation that drove them to dispel such fanciful notions, often reverberating amongst the monarchist expat diaspora and neocons alike, that the régime is on its last legs. However; in this they misjudged and missed the mark. In the Jan. 1 demands of Mousavi, did they see a phantom call to annul the election? Since writing “Ahmadinejad Won. Get Over It” they themselves haven’t gotten over the fact that this moved beyond the election quite some time ago (though Karroubi did allude to “respecting the electorate”). And they shill fatalism of the Reformist’s eventual failure almost gleefully (which is in a sense okay, given the emotional connection Iranians have for Imam Hossein, or Rostam). The apologists online seem to be clinging to that argument desperately, as if it abridged the Constitutional rights of Iranian citizens to gather. Furthermore, they, along with the Leveretts, see it as a vast minority and dwindling, comparing those whom risk considerable violence to assemble with those whom are given the day off, fed, and handed banners. While many of these apologists try to deride the opposition as a “Tea Party Movement” for its inchoate message (as if anti-war marches during the Bush administration practiced message discipline) or as North Tehrani ‘Birthers’; a more apt comparison could be found in the upheavals of the Civil Rights Movement of 1960’s America. As Hooman Majd said in Foreign Policy:

What is evident is that if we consider Iran’s pro-democracy “green movement” not as a revolution but as a civil rights movement — as the leaders of the movement do — then a “win” must be measured over time. The movement’s aim is not for a sudden and complete overthrow of Iran’s political system. That may disappoint both extremes of the American and Iranian political spectrums, left and right, and especially U.S. neoconservatives hoping for regime change.

Their sin is that the Leveretts know better, and in their attempt at dispassionate analysis, they’ve overcompensated, downplaying the hardline response and Principlist maneuverings which is, in my mind, implicit evidence of a more than insignificant challenge to their political grip on power – though this is not imperiled so long as hardliners and conservatives hold all significant levers of power. I also take note of Flynt Leverett’s friend, Mohammad Marandi (video). Remind you of anything (video)? Other good responses were from Abbas Milani in The New Republic, Enduring America’s Scott Lucas and Tehran Bureau’s Muhammad Sahimi.

While articles like this from the Los Angeles Times with headlines hinting at a government threatened with collapse and the spin from pro-Reform sites such as Rah-e Sabz (Green Path) are to be kept in mind, as should individual first-hand accounts; the alternative is most often Iranian state propaganda – as papers and web sites contradicting the hardline position are methodically shut down and journalists thrown in jail. Last count, going up in past few days, is now 63 at this writing. So, forgive me if I have more faith in Western media (for all of its faults) and Reformist sites than even more reasonable Press TV (comparatively speaking in comparison with other state funded media) whom produced this “exposé” on Neda Agha-Soltan’s death being faked, and spawning a YouTube video or two reminiscent of Oliver Stone’s famous “back and to the left” scene and defended by the same Alex Jones types that believe the moon landing was a hoax. To fully nail home the link between Iranian hardliners and Western woo-woos, is this whopper of a headline: “Report: US weapon test aimed at Iran caused Haiti quake”.

Time and time again, what Hooman Majd describes as “schizophrenic” responses and one-trick pony attempts to control the message, later reports tend to contradict initial denial. This is true of the Kahrizak detention center affair. According to BBC:

Iranian MPs lifted a blanket of official denial on the country’s post-election upheaval today by blaming a ­senior regime insider for abuses that led to the deaths of at least three prisoners in a detention centre. …

Today’s report dismissed a claim from Mortazavi that the prisoners had died from meningitis and ­acknowledged that they had been assaulted.

But of course, the sacrificial lamb they pinned this on, Saeed Mortazavi, claimed he was on vacation when these abuses and deaths occurred. Was the “butcher of the press” also on vacation when Zahra Kazemi, the Canadian photojournalist, was raped and her skull fractured in 2003? As Human Rights Watch pointed out, he was already a serial offender. In fact, after he was found responsible for Kahrizak abuses, the Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, Lawrence Cannon, called for her case to be revisited (since he, the accused, was put in charge of investigating the original case!) and her remains repatriated to Canada, per her family’s wishes.

By far the biggest source of intrigue this past month, was the bizarre assassination of particle physicist, Masoud Ali-Mohammadi on January 12th. State media immediately hailed him as a faithful supporter of the Revolution and institution of the velayat-e faghih, and reflexively pinned the blame on the US and Israel. Students of Ali-Mohammadi were then quick to point out that he had been a supporter of Mousavi. Am I saying that being true to the Islamic Republic and to Mousavi are mutually exclusive? No. That’s not what I’m saying.

Mohammad Reza Ali-Zamani and Arash Rahmanipour were hung on January 28th, having been sentenced in October for being members of the Anjoman Padeshahi-ye Iran (API, also known as Tondar, whom are a relatively obscure group with the aim of reestablishing the Pahlavi dynasty), for planning attacks on Ahmadinejad and apparently being connected with the 2008 Shiraz terrorist Mosque bombing (even though three others were already tried and executed for that). The AP’s Ali Akbar Dareini (in league with Zionists, mind you) reported:

The two men were arrested before the turmoil set off by claims that Ahmadinejad’s re-election was fraudulent. But Iran brought them to court in the same mass trial in an attempt to show that the political opposition is in league with violent armed groups in a foreign-backed plot to overthrow the Islamic system.

In addition; nine others have been sentenced to death for their role in the Ashura protests on December 27th. Five were confirmed by the MeK to be affiliated with them (though there’s debate whether they were part of a “militant wing” or not). The others were, predictably, tied to the API or unspecified monarchist groups in general. Along with these, seven Bahá’ís arrested (initially thought to be ten) on Ashura have been accused of spying for Israel. This probably has something to do with the seat of the Bahá’í faith being situated in Haifa. It also has a great deal to do with the century of persecution this “heretical” religion has faced in its home country of Iran. This past November, a conservative newspaper was even banned for featuring a photo of this famous temple in Delhi for an Indian tourism ad. Anyone familiar with India knows that this was nothing unusual.

So, the effort to contaminate Mousavi’s followers is indeed concerted, and this would appear to be one of those “schizophrenic” moves, as Hooman Majd has called them. Recently, the Iranian English daily, Tehran Times, claimed February 2nd, that VEVAK’s head, Heydar Moslehi, had found “clues”, but no one has been arrested. Given VEVAK’s track record with assassinations of intellectuals, this strikes me as ironic as placing Saeed Mortazavi in charge of the 2003 Zahra Kazemi inquiry. However; just because IRI propaganda is a one-trick pony, doesn’t mean it is always wrong. As Muhammad Sahimi pointed out in his own speculation (much recommended for a comprehensive overview of the case), Israel does have a self-declared program to assassinate nuclear scientists (might designate it with one of my favorite terms: ‘overt-covert’), as Mossad did in 2007, with Ardeshir Hassanpour. And, NCRI/MeK still has a presence within Iran, as evinced by their uncovering clandestine nuclear enrichment sites in the past few years. One problem: Ali-Mohammadi was not a nuclear scientist, as initially reported in Israeli and Western news. Former Mossad head, Shabtai Shavit, still active in the Israeli intelligence community, said he had no idea who Ali-Mohammadi was. That begs the question why I would believe an arch-spook; but the question remains: why? As Muhammad Sahimi crucially asked, “who benefits?” Given the hotbeds that universities are, it could have been a warning to intellectuals and students. It could have been botched intelligence (after all, why would one go to such lengths to carry out such an attack?). It could have been designed as a false-flag by either the IRI or Western interests. This type of event is the bread and butter of conspiracy theorists. And, of course, it elicits certitude from those who blame Israel for absolutely everything under the sun, as well as the bitterest (understandable as it can be) of the Iranian diaspora cursing the akhoond-ha (mollahs). I myself will admit to joining in with jokes on my theory that it was a yarmulke-wearing elven ET astride a flying unicorn which farts rainbows and can bend the time-space continuum with his magic shofar. Bottom line though – from all initial accounts this was a nice man. And if I were to interpret clues, it would be that while the modus operandi of a bomb was that of exile terrorist groups, the account of Ali Mohammadi’s funeral offers its own clues, as well. Try and rest in peace, doctor.

I would like to make one thing clear here. I do not support terrorism and assassination by anyone – especially of scientists and intellectuals. Whether it be the mojahedin, monarchists, Israel, or the IRI itself. Israeli “fatwas” upon scientists associated with the nuclear program should be held in moral contempt. If you guys really are responsible for any of these acts post-election, knock it the fuck off! You are not helping! If you believe violence is a legitimate tactic, read this essay and make your counter-argument.

And congratulations to you, Sarah Palin. Iranian state-media rejoiced at this:

Say he decided to declare war on Iran or decide to really come out and do whatever he could to support Israel–which I would like him to do.

You just made yourself not only a hardline collaborator with that gem, but proved yourself to truly be ‘fucking retarded’. (don’t worry, I claim the same satire immunity granted to Rush).

But, back to the Iranian domestic front. January 16th saw this statement, from Police Chief Ahmadi Moghaddam (statements such as this were hardly isolated, and Ayatollah Jannati’s was characteristically more fiery, forgive me for only offering one):

“These people should know where they are sending the SMS and e-mail as these systems are under control. They should not think using proxies will prevent their identification,” Mr Ahmadi Moghaddam said.

He warned that those who incited others to protest or issued appeals: “have committed a worse crime than those who come to the streets”.

And this is not limited to within Iran’s borders:

A worldwide movement that has relied heavily on Web sites such as Twitter and Facebook to express opposition to Iranian authorities has found they aren’t the only ones taking advantage of social networking and media coverage; Iranian government forces are apparently using those same tools to hold citizens accountable for their relatives’ actions outside the country.

Also beyond Iran’s boundaries (well, according to International Law, not technically), two diplomats have issued resignations of protest due to governmental violence (well, more like one and a half). Mohammad Reza Heydari, posted in Oslo, and former diplomat Abolfazl Eslami in Tokyo has gone public with some provocative statements on the mood of those in the Foreign Ministry, supposedly. This is why attacking embassies like the Swedish incident is shortsighted.

22 Bahman, anniversary of the Victory of the Islamic Revolution has been stepping up the last week or two. Opposition leaders are full of resolve and defying calls of conservatives and Supreme Leader not to continue their “sedition”. Following are some excerpts from the prime leaders.

Karroubi in late January issued this:

Although today they have shut down newspapers, filtered websites, imprisoned many of our dear friends, closed down the office of [reformist] parties including the Etemade Melli office and even my personal office, although they fired shots at my car, although some are threatening everyday and are insulting Mir Hossein Mousavi, me and the great nation of Iran in every way possible and take our words out of content, but I am firmly announcing that I never compromise over people’s rights and one of the main rights of this nation is their votes that they casted in the ballot boxes while trusting the authorities; and I will be with the people till the very end and will try for holding free elections and eliminating current obstacles.

Khatami’s February 1st statement, while mentioning the elections, drives home the point I am making against those whom willfully ignore, downplay, or rationalize the events transpiring since:

The freedom that we are talking about is the freedom of speech, freedom of opinion, freedom of expressing that opinion, and freedom of employing that opinion and people being asked to give their inputs about that opinion.

The requirement for freedom in its true meaning, which in short is the power of the people over their own destiny, is the freedom of speech and assembly. How could it be possible that there are parties but they don’t have any platform to express their views and cannot hold gatherings?

In a calm and civil environment, people should get a chance to come and then it would be clear what poeple’s tendencies are. And more important than this is the elections that should be free, healthy, and trustworthy.

On February 2nd, Mousavi’s interview with Kalemeh came out. This included 14 points. The election was not mentioned (I realize my earlier claim is muddled, given Khatami’s and Karroubi’s continued skepticism). This is a classic Reformist platform, only explicit in its criticism. Instead of posting it all, I would really, really recommend reading it here. If not that, BBC gives an abstract. In addition; Khatami has a more recent 22 Bahman statement (Reformist plank, largely).

Of course, Ahmadinejad & Co. tried desperately to change the subject. Whether it was its nuclear offer to send LEU abroad or later tantrum to enrich itself (I, by the way thought the West totally misplayed this, and should have put the onus on Ahmadinejad to back up his bluff in a fractious Iranian political climate). Whether it was a failed rocket launch into space or proposed prisoner swap for the three American hikers (sorry, SPIES!). Whether it was again threatening to cut ties with the British Museum over the Cyrus Cylinder after threatening it for weeks (the irony of this is beyond words), or stoning the Italian embassy in Tehran amidst orchestrated cries of “Death to Italy” (WTF?!). And summoning Canada’s charge d’affaires for this? Sentencing Khatami’s former deputy foreign minister to six years and executing proxy Greens, check! Even censoring images and video of the ‘79 Revolution itself? why not! Indeed, it’s as if they were trying to exhaust their full bag of tricks…

I will give credit to the MSM for not being completely distracted by the shiny ball tactic from Tehran to leave the slated demonstration completely uncovered. They do appear to have improved their learning curve. They have hysterically exaggerated the nuclear announcement as usual (Ahmadinejad has the MSM and American public at large so trained. He says “fetch” and we froth at the mouth and wag our tails obediently). Juan Cole says “oh noes!” to medical isotope levels of enrichment. I cannot believe I honestly caught a FOX news model saying this was close to the weapons grade level required. Oh wait, yes I can. But, the MSM still fails pathetically in connecting the two stories and taking into consideration the internal dynamics and intended geopolitical misdirection.

Today, the talk was also of sanctions aimed at the Pasdaran. This has been coming for some time. In my own mini-Rashomon entry I’ll treat the issue of sanctions:

• Wall Street Journal: “US Shifts Iran Focus to Support Opposition” (Jan. 9, 2010)
• Tehran Bureau (PBS): “New Sanctions Miss the Target” (Jan. 30, 2010)
• BBC News: “US expands Iran Guards sanctions” (Feb. 10, 2010)
• Press TV: “US blacklists Iranian commander, firms” (Feb. 10, 2010 – notice the picture of Stuart Levey)

Another aspect every sympathetic observer is still monitoring are trade unions and strikes (just one example) and arrests. I hope to have more on this at some time.

Before ending this update in preparation for 22 Bahman, some fun.

• Sexually suggestive logo made up of letters and how the show “24″ was part of the plot to elect Obama! (Pedestrian has some of the most original stuff – my tip o’ the hat)
• The color green in Iran’s flag was replaced with blue at Ahmadinejad speeches.
• Breaking news: Iranian turtle-astronauts defect to the west.

And, my final story, the subject of which was once an intellectual obsession of mine: “Iranians celebrate ancient Persian fire fest”

Thousands of Iranians gathered at dusk against a snowy mountain backdrop to light giant bonfires in an ancient mid-winter festival dating back to Iran’s pre-Islamic past that is drawing new interest from Muslims.

Saturday’s celebration was the first in which the dwindling remnants of Iran’s once plentiful Zoroastrian religious minority were joined by thousands of Muslims, reflecting a growing interest in the strict Islamic society for the country’s ancient traditions.

Video slide show worth watching for any interested in world religions (you just might recognize someone’s avatar in it).

Some music. And yes, this would be an example of the secular “Westoxified” upper middle-class. No a-ha moment here. I’ve also posted noheh videos. And any criticism to how out of touch I am with the “common Iranian on the street” I would say, so what? It isn’t only the élite that consume such Western-style music. And, why is it that the fundamentalists respond not solely with their own music, or their own ideas, but like the schoolyard bully outwitted, resort to bannings, force and intimidation? All should be free to express themselves. That is my conviction.

Hypernova – Viva La Resistance

My apologies for being late with this update, as well as all mistakes herein. For the umpteenth time, I am very adamant pointing out I am not a professional, and I know it. I was getting a little burned out and slacked off the past month in following Iran. I hope to be more prompt with the Revolution Day demonstrations. But, as with demonstrations before, this will take a few days, as that is how long it takes for information, videos and analyses to come out.

OK how did our crack media outlets miss out on this story I found on BBC news?

Like usual our media is obsessed with the sensational stories, faux outrage, and politically motivated opinions instead of real news. It seems it’s much more important that the president reminded Nevadans that they allow gambling in their state than to worry about global security. So obviously it’s just not important enough to our failed forth estate that Israel may not bomb Iran after all.

Iran’s president has said it is ready to send its enriched uranium abroad for further enrichment under a deal to ease concerns about its nuclear programme.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told state TV that Iran would have “no problem” if most of its stock was held for several months before being returned as fuel rods.

Correspondents say that such a decision would be a major shift in Tehran’s position.

The US said that if this was a new offer, it was “prepared to listen”.

Last month, diplomats said Iran had informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it did not accept the terms of the deal and had instead demanded a simultaneous exchange on its territory.

The US and its allies fear Iran is attempting to develop nuclear weapons. Iran insists its nuclear programme is entirely peaceful.

‘Definitive answer’

The deal agreed in October between Iran, the IAEA and the so-called P5+1 – the US, Russia, China, UK, France plus Germany – envisaged Iran sending about 70% of its low-enriched uranium to Russia and France, where it would be processed into fuel for a research reactor.

Ashura 1388 – December 27, 2009, begins over 1,300 years ago. During the three year reign of Yazid I (680-683 CE) of the Ummayad Caliphate, one man refused to swear allegiance to the caliph, he was Hossein, son of Ali, the father whom Shi’as believe the Prophet Mohammad designated to be his successor as spiritual leader and commander in chief of the faithful. (Ali was a son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet Mohammad, Hossein was his grandson.) However; Ali lost out in the immediate aftermath and when he was finally made the fourth (and considered last of the “Rightly Guided”, or Rashidun, caliphs even by Sunnis) by the Ummah, he was assassinated five years into his rule in a Kufa Mosque (present day south-central Iraq) and later buried in Najaf, the third holiest site in Shi’a Islam (behind Mecca and Medina). Ali, like Mohammad (again, this is the Shi’i view) had in turn designated his eldest son Hassan (and older brother of Hossein) to be his successor; but a powerful military leader and Syrian governor by name of Mu’awiya, who had been appointed by the second of the Rashidun caliphs, Umar, swept down, forced Hassan to acquiesce on his claim, and founded the Ummayad Caliphate. His son was Yazid.

After the accession, Hossein’s rebellion against Yazid began in earnest, Yazid was to be regarded as a tyrant and usurper by the Shi’at ‘Ali (Partisans of Ali, meaning of Shi’a). Ironically enough, Hossein opposed the dynastic rule even though the Shi’a schism was founded on the basis that rule ought to be limited to the Prophet’s bloodline (they would contend that through Allah’s messenger they had divine mandate, or nass, unlike Yazid). The climax of this power struggle was at the Battle of Karbala, which took place on the tenth day of the first Islamic month of Moharram (as opposed to the Persian calendar, which overlaps with Dey, this year – here’s a handy calendar converter I use often).

Days before the battle, Hossein and his men, were en route to Kufa from Mecca and intercepted by a group of around a thousand mounted soldiers from Yazid’s army, then compelled to agree to be escorted away from reaching Kufa. The next day, a contingent of four-thousand more of Yazid’s men arrived with an order to have Hossein swear fealty; he refused, and soldiers blocked access to the nearby river. After a few days Yazid decided it was time to finish the recalcitrant challenger off. On the tenth day of Moharram, roughly ten thousand (though numbers are often inflated greatly) of Yazid’s army was assembled around a camp of Hossein’s seventy-two men. Hossein had pleaded with his men to try and escape, to leave him, and tried to reason with the soldiers amassed against them, but Yazid’s army was unyielding, and soon archers were shooting volleys of arrows down upon them. Trapped, dying like the tethered animals with them, Hossein’s men refused to abandon their leader and charged at the army one by one, each being cut down one after the other. At long last, Hossein, after all other able men had gone to their death, with his dead infant son whose throat had been pierced with an arrow in his hands, fought valiantly until at long last he too, parched with thirst and beleaguered as he was, succumbed. His death blow was delivered by Shemr (also known to Shi’as as the “Curse of Allah”), who decapitated Hossein, put his head on a pike, and proceeded to pillage the camp and refused him proper Muslim burial, leaving his body in the desert for three to four days. One might compare it to the Battle of Thermopylae (and I will, briefly, since it’s a fabulous excuse to link this Iranian rapper’s response to the movie “300″). But a better comparison would be with the Passion of Jesus Christ. In any case, his shrine supposedly stands near the spot where he died, similar to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. All analogies must end here though, too many are only a disservice.

The day of the battle is commemorated on the day of Ashura with the preceding days of the beginning of Moharram recounting all the events leading up to it. The outline I’ve written above is by no means complete, I’ve abridged it to the bare bones, and often it is exaggerated for greatest emotional appeal (like Imam Hossein single-handedly slaying over a thousand men before Shemr cut him down, like some sort of Shi’a Siegfried). Mourners, dressed in black and hanging black flags outside their homes, will attend ta’ziehs, or passion plays, where events are dramatically recreated theatrically, rosehs where a Roseh-khoon, mollahs who specializing in performing monologues retelling a story every Iranian knows by heart, but still reducing men to tears (as Hooman Majd says in his book, The Ayatollah Begs to Differ, “[R]eal Shia men do cry”); and often following that, nohehs, or songs around those themes. This is one by two of the most famous noheh singers, Helali and Sibsorkhi. And most famously (not to mention infamously), during the matam, or mourning procession, where men ceremonially beat themselves with chains called zanjirs and chant “Ya Hossein!” and similar exhortations. Contrary to what some might assume, the shedding of blood we often see sensationalized from other parts of the Shi’a world, with knives and such (though usually shallow cuts anyway), are in fact ruled against in this by Grand Ayatollah Sistani (and some other guy), and actively discouraged in the Islamic Republic. Most of these processions are choreographed and form a sort of competition for different groups to see who can outperform one another. Often, young women will be hanging over the edges of the ramparts, cheering the young men on, whom beat themselves more furiously than the next to impress the ladies. Yes, sex finds its way into even this solemn rite. How could it not, with the frenzied fever it can produce? This year, as most, the ceremonies of Taft, in Yazd Province, were televised nationally. They seemed to be covering every little aspect of the story of Hossein, the rituals, the meaning; all the while completely “unaware” anything else was happening. I’m sure it was just a coincidence. Televised Ashura ceremonies from Taft is like the Midnight Mass (er, sorry, 10 p.m.) from the Vatican, or Barsana for Holi, it’s something they do best. Khamene’i also delivers his own roseh. Most years, green headbands and flags are also a signature feature. This year, even after one promise from police commander Azizollah Rajabzadeh, they reneged on it, descending on those with “suspicious” green, I suppose. One by one the regime’s symbols are being taken back from it by the people to whom they rightfully belong.

Former President, chairman of the Expediency Council, Assembly of Experts and long time de facto second most powerful man of the Islamic Republic, Hashemi Rafsanjani, is attributed as saying, “[I]f you want to understand Iran, you must become a Shi’a first.” I believe the second best thing anyone interested in Iran could do, is in understanding Shi’a basics. It is also helpful in decoding the layered meanings of some of the slogans. Even the chant to Obama of “are you with us, or against us?” can be traced back to something Imam Hossein said.

Shi’ism was made the state religion by Shah Esma’il I, founder of the Safavid Dynasty in the beginning of the 16th century CE. The decree and conversion of Sunni Iran to Twelver Shi’ism was draconian and completed fairly quickly. Many historians contend that it was also possibly a cynical move more than a personal conviction, given the protracted conflict with the Sunni Ottomans. The truth is, anyway, that it absorbed an already peculiarly Persian form of Sunni Islam, with elements of nationalist myth (best encapsulated by Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh), features of Zoroastrian doctrine and practice melded under the guise of Islam, and Sufi poetry from masters like Hafez and Sa’di. The continued observance of the new year, or Nowruz, is a prominent and enduring example of this tendency (even though the Islamic Republic initially wanted to ‘wipe’ it from the calendar), plus the old saying that “every Persian has written at least one line of poetry in their lifetime,” Shah Esma’il included. Shi’ism, in fact, tapped into the Iranian soul. It allowed greater freedom in interpretation, for one. The austere Sunni proscription against human images just was never gonna fly in the artsy “France of the Middle East”.

The contradictions of Iran can be highlighted among some more chauvinist attitudes held toward Arabs, like in the pejorative malakh-khor (‘locust eater’; interestingly enough, the name of the border crossing near where the three American hikers – sorry, “spies!” – were apprehended). And yet, they had to reconcile the fact that they were practicing the faith of their conquerors, with a holy book in the revealed language of Arabic, and whose culture they had always looked down upon for centuries and praying to a land considered but a backwards frontier to the Persian Empires. The bridging of this history is perhaps best exemplified in the dubious hagiographical belief that Hossein (whom, as Shi’ism developed greatly over the centuries, particularly after becoming a state religion, would be venerated as the Third Imam) married a Persian princess, daughter of the last Sassanid shah (the second and last great Persian Empire), Yazdegerd III, whom had been defeated by Caliph Umar’s forces (this is also slightly reminiscent of Alexander the Great marrying his officers to Persian noblewomen and adopting customs of the royal court after his conquest of the first great Persian Empire, the Achaemenids; and taken by Persians to this day as an acknowledgment of their superior culture). The Shi’i concepts of martyrdom, zolm (oppression, cruelty, tyranny), and ‘adl (justice), borne out of Imam Hossein’s martyrdom and the narrative built upon throughout years of persecution as a minority in the Muslim world (which, by the way, is the origin of taghiyeh, or dissimulation, often mentioned derisively among the Daniel Pipes crowd) instilled within it. It may have well struck a chord with a scarred Persian pride, grieved and shamed at being conquered by “inferior” Arabs, and seen as a way to give Islam their own unique touch. As such, though it is a significant population in Lebanon, Bahrain, and Iraq, Islamic scholars such as Reza Aslan suggest it is, in a very real way, “Persian Islam”. It is also a sect ideal for rebellion, fueled upon by the blood of martyrs (another interesting synthesis is the legend of the tulip growing from the ground where a martyr spilled his blood, dating to pre-Islamic times – next time you see a speech with pretty tulips everywhere – keep this in mind). As such, it provides special complications for a regime who used its themes, slogans and mourning cycles to overthrow a shah; i.e. “Yazid” – most notably in 1963 and 1978. Even more consternating is when they are officially tied to the state and Ashura is as much a governmental, as religious observance. After all, though the country had been Shi’a for a long time, it had held to the Shi’i belief in Quietism. (I seem to have misplaced my articles on this Najafi/Qomi; and Sadra/Majlesi debate which still shape seminary debates to this day. No matter, this can wait.) Clerics were not to rule, they were traditionally apportioned the role as the spiritual conscience for a nation, and would protest when a ruler trespassed their limits, when no other power bloc could dare out of risk of retribution. But, alas, the powers that be are always much easier to criticize, when you’re not the powers that be; especially not a shah and a cleric rolled into one. Ain’t that the darndest thing, Seyyid Yazid?

* * *

On the 25th, Enduring America noticed that on his website,

Rafsanjani puts forth Hossein’s opposition to the caliph as the most significant political movement in the last 1400 years, with its promotion of virtues and condemnation of injustice and evil. And, in an all-too-obvious parallel with the 21st century, he asserts that Hossein was accused of having revolted for power and collaborated with foreigners to which the Imam answered: “I’m not revolting to Govern; my revolt is to protect and correct the course of the disciples of my ancestor [the Prophet Mohammad].”

After a relatively quiet Thursday and Friday, on Saturday, or Tasu’a, the eve of Ashura, people came out at 11 a.m and continued in the streets until 9 p.m. At one such event  former reformist president Mohammad Khatami and supporter of Mir-Hossein Mousavi was speaking at Jamaran Hosseiniyeh around 6:00 p.m. Tehran time (a Hosseiniyeh is often a special mosque built especially for the occasion of Moharram; Jamaran is an area of northern Tehran, famous for being Khomeini’s home during his lifetime). Busloads of Basijis had been dropped off, loudspeakers are alleged (via Tweet) to have said “if you do not disperse, we have orders to shoot” and the Basij videotaped faces chanting “Death to Khamene’i”, “Ya Hossein, Mir-Hossein” and “This is the month of blood, Yazid will fall”. At the point of Khatami’s speech when he said, “Imam Hossein’s rebellion arose from his willingness to die for the sake of freedom. He fought against those who wanted to govern society in the name of religion and abolish freedom,” Basijis stormed in [ video ] and eventually cut his microphone which summarily ended the gathering only half way through. Those who didn’t disperse were beaten as indiscriminately as the windows the Basijis smashed, the crowd protected Khatami though, so he could escape. Also in attendance were Rafsanjani’s two daughters, Fatemeh and Faezeh and Ayatollah Khomeini’s grandson, Yasser, high profile Reformist figures in their own right.  Also on Tasu’a, in the city of Shiraz, Ayatollah Ali Mohammad Dastghaib’s house was laid siege to, as was Ayatollah Jalaleddin Taheri’s in Esfahan. I’ve gone on enough tangents as it is, I’ll just say that this guy is another name for you to try and file away.

And it wasn’t just people at gatherings, dissident clerics, or those on foot,

According to Jaras, police officers were seen striking the sides of cars with their batons, tearing off license plates, and in some cases dragging drivers out of cars and assaulting them.

After Ahmadinejad’s (ostensibly his, that is) firing of Mousavi Tuesday, in which he had to interrupt a meeting in Shiraz (southern Iran) to fly up and back down again, as head of the Academy of the Arts, and increased threats against opposition leaders, things are heating up and a breaking point with full, unhinged crackdown is feared. Among these threats was from the Supreme Leader’s representative to the Pasdaran (IRGC), Hojjat-ol-Eslam Mojtaba Z’ol-Nour, who said, according to The Washington Post:

“If we throw all three heads of the green sedition into prison, nothing will happen at all,” Zolnour said, warning the Basij forces not to act independently toward the two leaders, whose movement uses the color green. “But if we take any physical action against them, it is possible that the flames of these issues will spread.”

Z’ol-Nour, in hardline newspaper Resalat (via Juan Cole’s blog) also let this slip December 17th [emphasis mine]:

“Authorities should introduce traitors to the people as soon as possible.” He pointed to the supreme leader’s description of the recent sedition as ‘a deep sedition . . . ‘ ‘Hojat ol-eslam Mojtaba Zolnur said: One of the reasons for such a description is the scale of that sedition. He added: There were many seditions after the Islamic revolution, such as that of anti-revolutionary groups, Banisadr’s, Montazeri’s, imposed war, etc., but none of them spread the seeds of doubt and hesitation among various social layers as much as the recent one.”

Sort of spoils the “rich kiddies from North Tehran” argument, no? Also significant is reference to Montazeri and Banisadr. Banisadr was the first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, whom following interim Prime Minister Bazargan were both French educated liberal-minded moderate leaders in the early years following the Revolution (probably ate arugula, too, with real moutarde de Dijon). During the Hostage Crisis, Khomeini and the IRP (the faction most associated with establishing the theocracy we see today) effectively purged them both. The way in which they did it, with the aid of Pasdaran and Hezbollahi thuggery, further adds to the emptiness and hypocrisy of their accusations against “hooligan” demonstrators today. To buttress Z’ol-Nour’s statement, The Christian Science Monitor reported  that the Esfahan governor had called for a state of emergency during the Montazeri mourning ceremonies earlier last week. There were descriptions of martial law in Najafabad (Montazeri’s hometown, which the CSM article totally fudged up on) on his haftom (his seven day death anniversary, also coinciding with Ashura, covered below). And there was a stir of speculation over these photos of a national gathering of provincial police chiefs preparing for Ashura. -As if this billboard of Khamene’i didn’t send its own chilling message (translation: We await Moharam, when it will be a time for trial, it will be our blades and your throats if even one hair on Ali’s (Khamenei) head is lost.).

According to Rah-e Sabz, another interesting story of note

Caretakers at the Mausoleum issued a bulletin saying that owing to limited space due to renovations, only a few heyats (organized groups of mourners) would be hosted there this year.

It should be noted that this past Ramadan was the first time since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of Iran’s revolution, that his mausoleum did not host Ramadan ceremonies.

* * *

Day of Ashura – as you might have suspected, SMS and internet was down to a crawl (and had been for days), Rah-e Sabz site blocked sporadically but later back up, heavy security presence, city squares cordoned off, metro stations monitored, shots fired in the air – in short, the usual.  Cities included Tehran (including south central and southeast), Shiraz, Esfahan, Najafabad, Mashhad, Arak, Babol, Orumieh and Tabriz. In Tehran it was the most violent clashes since June. [note: following are all video links] Protesters chipped up concrete, set fire to Basiji motorbikes, police vehicles and even a police outpost. There was also this (they harmed a hair on your head!) and this (street sign says “Khamene’i Dd.END”, in Perso-Arabic and Roman scripts) of “desecration” to the velayat-e faghih, poor thing. Here’s some of those young kiddies causin’ the trouble we hear about from the IRI and its Western apologists so much. [end of video links] Besides police being outnumbered in some cases and surrendering, a few videos show them taking off their helmets and leaving the scene voluntarily, as well. Of course, state-run media, after first trying to ignore them, described anti-government demonstrations as groups of dozens of troublemakers, accused one of setting a Qur’an on fire, and even tried to bring the Rajavi cult (MeK) into it [yes, three different links]. To be honest, considering the NCRI did uncover the Natanz enrichment program and that they would have known today was a big day, I’m not ruling it out. All I know, is that if I hear the government or IRIB (same thing, actually, and why protesters gathered at its building and set a fire) bring up the Anjoman-e Padeshahi-ye Iran yet again, I’ll definitely be rolling my eyes. Nevertheless, whether true or not, their goal is to smear them all as traitors (IRI-speak is “sowing disunity”, something they know a lot about) by bringing up the most reviled group in Iran, apart from the clerical and Basiji hardliners themselves, that is.

Jaras reported that police also refused orders to open fire on occasion. But apparently this wasn’t always the case. Without a doubt the biggest headline will be that Ali Mousavi, Mir-Hossein Mousavi’s nephew, was shot and killed. His body has disappeared (and the state-media and its apologists – out in force saying the same thing this morning on Iranian sites – claim it was MeK), as have others slain (for a body not to be buried the following day, is in most cases considered against Islamic injunctions on burial rites). The death toll is at ten, according to opposition sites, with four in Tabriz and one in Shiraz. 300 (I saw 1,000 on one site, I need to see it somewhere else first) have been arrested. Rumors of at least one occasion where a car escorted by motorbike-mounted Basijis pulled up, pulled several protesters off the street, and disappeared. This has been standard operating procedure for “disappearances” for many years, it is not out of the question. It would also make it a believable rumor. Another one was of a riot van running over a man. I really do resent the fact that apologists have the luxury to question my perceptions down to almost epistemological levels sometimes, due to the regime they defend banning all foreign media, and if it’s not that, it’s vain attempts to appeal to my natural progressive sense of anti-imperialism or my sympathy for Palestinians (as if the two were not harmonious causes, and I’m supposed to be one of those rabid “push Israel into the sea” types too, I’m sure). It is sick and twisted logic, and if the IRI wanted to clear up “misunderstandings”, why not let  journalists in? If they don’t like speculation, they’re the ones inviting it, the rest of us do the best to guess. Do you really want me to believe, after denying reports, that some of the deaths were just car crashes and that one person, losing their balance I’m sure, just “fell” off a bridge? Then let us confirm it. We apologize for offending your pride by questioning your state-media, itself which has purged a few un-ideologically pure staff. An example of their dedication to a free and fair press is seen by their acknowledgment of arresting a Dubai-based Syrian reporter for attending the Ashura demonstrations and daring to (gasp!) observe and report. Also standard operating procedure (and forgive the pun this one takes), is the suspicious removal of those injured from general hospitals to Pasdaran-run hospitals.

The deaths are also seen in another light in this article, and as reported by The New York Times:

“Ashura is a very symbolic day in our culture, and it revives the notion that the innocents were killed by a villain,” said Fatemeh Haghighatjoo, a former member of the Iranian Parliament who is a visiting scholar at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. “Killing people on Ashura shows how far Khamenei is willing to go to suppress the protests.”

That same article goes on to say that they raided a Reformist clerical association in Qom (I’m left to guess that it’s probably the Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qom – I friggin’ get annoyed at unspecific Western articles which make me do their job). In at least one case in Iran considering the coordinated quarantining of clerics, the demonstrators got there first, in Mashhad, at Grand Ayatollah Sane’i’s house, and the Imam Reza shrine (I’m linking to the shrines’ Wikipedia pages this time, due to the religious nature of this article; that it is important to be familiar with the major ones; and that, well, they’re gorgeous).

Remarking on the day Juan Cole summarized thusly:

For the regime to create a member of the Mousavi family as a martyr on Ashura was most unwise. Shiite Islam even more than traditional Catholicism thrives on the blood of martyrs.

Junior or middle-ranking Ayatollahs favorable to the ideas of Montazeri show up in a number of these reports about protests in provincial cities, suggesting a generational split in the clerical corps and trouble for Khamenei ahead.

Iran’s political crisis is far from over, even though the opposition has little hope of coming to power as long as the security forces remain firmly behind Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Ahmad Bakhshayesh, of Allameh Tabatatabi University in Tehran (known for its liberalism) adds to this thought, “I believe we are moving toward a more militarized and repressive confrontation. Things are going to get worse.” Gary Sick would concur.

Mehdi Karroubi, whose car windows were smashed (and who has had his security detail removed by the government), like Mousavi’s attack last week, said that the kind of offenses seen on this Ashura wouldn’t have even been committed by the shah, “[T]he sins that you have committed today cannot be forgiven by God. If you don’t have a belief in God, at least be a human.”

It would appear with the arrest of ten reformist figures, like Mir-Hossein Mousavi’s top advisor, Ali Reza Beheshti, and his brother-in-law, Shapour Kazemi, that Mousavi’s nephew was targeted (whether or not it was an apprehension gone wrong is left to be seen). Expect more chants like this, “I will kill, I will kill, he who has killed my brother!” Also arrested were Ebrahim Yazdi, Foreign Minister under Bazargan, and whom has carried on Bazargan’s banned party, the Freedom Movement of Iran. This guy’s been in trouble before, and is about as close to a progressive as you can get for a political figure in the Islamic Republic. Another name to remember. He’s a bit of a character, as well, if I remember correctly. Another arrest is someone, ironically, who speaks out for prisoner’s rights and against the death penalty, a position for which he just completed a one year sentence last year. Perhaps most significantly for the West was the arrest of Shirin Ebadi’s sister, Noushin. Shirin concluded this was likely for a recent phone call, after Dr. Noushin Ebadi, a professor of medicine, was warned repeatedly not to call her (and yet they’ve also threatened her for years to pressure Shirin to drop her campaign, go figure). Methinks the Nobel medal wasn’t merely misplaced and miraculously found again, after all.

In response to the escalating crackdown President Barack Obama issued this statement, echoing those from Germany, France, Britain and other EU countries from Hawai’i:

The United States joins with the international community in strongly condemning the violent and unjust suppression of innocent Iranian citizens, which has apparently resulted in detentions, injuries and even death.

For months the Iranian people have sought nothing more than to exercise their universal rights.  Each time they have done so they have been met with the iron fist of brutality, even on solemn occasions and holy days.  And each time that has happened the world has watched with deep admiration for the courage and the conviction of the Iranian people, who are a part of Iran’s great and enduring civilization.

What’s taking place within Iran is not about the United States or any other country — it’s about the Iranian people and their aspirations for justice and a better life for themselves.  And the decision of Iran’s leaders to govern through fear and tyranny will not succeed in making those aspirations go away.  As I said in Oslo, it’s telling when governments fear the aspirations of their own people more than the power of any other nation.

Along with all free nations the United States stands with those who seek their universal rights.  We call upon the Iranian government to abide by the international obligations that it has to respect the rights of its own people.  We call for the immediate release of all who have been unjustly detained within Iran.  We will continue to bear witness to the extraordinary events that are taking place there.  And I’m confident that history will be on the side of those who seek justice.

Now, I’m not saying there’s gonna be chants of “Ya Hossein, Barack Hossein”, but can you guys tell, like me, that he had some help from his Iran team on that? Notice all the subtleties, the choice of words. Notice how many times he used words like ‘justice’, which when translated, will have Shi’i connotations? I noticed the same with his Cairo speech regarding broader Islamic themes. No doubt, the GOP will still pretend he hasn’t issued any statements regarding the situation, or criticize him for being too late, or still being too soft. In a CNN interview with Trita Parsi of the National Iranian American Council, he remarks on Obama’s fine line with which he has to take – which isn’t appeasement, it is about not impeding the Green Movement and getting out of our own way. On the forcefulness of the Obama statement, I’m wondering what analysts are seeing, as well. I don’t want to follow this thought too much, as the US has had a habit of being dead wrong reading the internal situation of Iran time and time again; but I can’t help but wonder if they thought the situation was tipping enough one way or the other to merit it. No statement like that is just done on the fly. I’ll bet you they had a draft of that since at least Montazeri’s passing. Not nearly as long as Ahmadinejad’s mocking and – yawn – most recent – yawn – accusations of – yawn – foreign – yawn – meddling. The advantage of not having an embassy in Tehran is not having your afternoon tea disturbed every time Iran wants a distraction. This was said on state television by Ali Larijani, Speaker of the Majles, and did give me slight pause though, “[P]arliament wants the judiciary and intelligence bodies to arrest those who insult religion and impose the maximum punishment on them without reservation.” Whether this is serious or not, I’ll have to check out, Larijani isn’t a firebrand, but he does know to say what he’s told to say. Ever wonder what the practical internal motives are for hardline bluster, by the way? Oh, what, you still aren’t awake after the Zionist/American belabored biped of blame? (it’s the Iranian equivalent of ‘noun, verb, 9/11′ x 100) Don’t worry, this Ahmadi nugget will wake you up after that snoozefest of his earlier:

Sixty five years ago, seventy years ago Second World War commenced.  In this war more than sixty million people were killed.  Now you travel to Europe, see if there is any name of these dead at all.  Is there any indication of these dead?  Never!

* * *

As Ayatollah Khomeini used to say, appropriating an old Shi’a saying, “every day is Ashura, every land is Karbala.” Today the demonstrators say “Hossein, Hossein is our slogan; being a martyr is our pride” and call Khamene’i Yazid. It isn’t so much inversion, as it is the recognition of a grim reality for the Pasdaran and their allies. Ayatollah Vaez-Tabasi, member of  the Assembly of Experts, Expediency Council, and with the plum position as head of the Imam Reza Shrine Foundation, I might add – someone who is clearly on good terms with the Supreme Leader – said that “seditious” leaders are moharebs (or, ‘those who wage war against Allah’, that fun nebulous charge which happens to carry the death penalty). And yet where does he stand when women are anally raped in prison by guards for reasons amounting to political terrorism? Every stale chant Basijis and their Shemr supporters direct at demonstrators, calling them “hypocrites”, rings hollow. Maybe they should practice in front of a mirror for more resonance.

It is said that a tear shed for Hossein can wash away all sins. May Allah be merciful to these men; history won’t be.

30 Azar 1388 -- December 21, 2009. The epicenter of the clerical establishment of Iran, the city of Qom, about a hundred miles southwest of the capital, was shaken by demonstrators mourning for the recently deceased Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri. In the words of Shirin Ebadi, “the father of human rights” in Iran.

Born in 1922, in the town of Najafabad, near Isfahan, Montazeri was jailed by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi numerous times, tortured by SAVAK and a confidant of exiled Ayatollah Khomeini. It was he who was prominent in devising the theory of guardianship of the jurist (or Velayat-e Faghih) and drawing it into the second draft of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He was chosen as heir apparent by the “Imam” (Khomeini’s affectionate title) until a falling out between the two.

After harsh criticisms of the 1988 Massacres of political dissidents (real and imagined) and Khomeini’s fatwa against author Salman Rushdie, Montazeri sardonically chided Khomeini with, “people in the world are getting the idea that our business in Iran is just murdering people.” Statements such as this, in addition to machinations of Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ahmad Khomeini (Ruhollah Khomeini’s son) in the background for succession, threw Montazeri out of favor and made him a pariah within the IRI oligarchy. However; it also proved an indelible break that he and many other originally radical ideologues were making with their original vision. Montazeri would later contend that Khomeini twisted his theory (which, believe me, isn’t far-fetched, Khomeini was great at borrowing and twisting ideas for his own gain, one only need compare Ali Shariati’s philosophy to his). In one of Montazeri’s last statements,

“The goal (of the revolution) was not simply to change the names and slogans but keep the same oppression and abuses practiced by the previous regime. Everyone knows I am a defender of theocratic government, although not in the current form. The difference lies in the fact that I intended for the people to choose the jurist and supervise his work… I now feel ashamed of the tyranny conducted under this banner. What we see now is the government of a military guardianship, not the guardian of Islamic scholars.”

He said that his theory was for the clerics to perform more as guides, and that he never meant for a hierarchy, but for them to issue opinions by consensus (the difference between limited and absolute clerical rule). To demonstrate what an influential force Montazeri was, this has been the backbone of the Reformist plank, i.e., amending the Constitution per Article 177 to redefine the position of Faghih. This was last done prior to Khomeini’s death from cancer. Knowing his new replacement lacked the genuine following, charisma and religious credentials, Khomeini had revisions drawn up and put to a referendum. Today, the demands are of the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council’s powers to be curtailed, if not the latter being outright abolished, along the with the corrupt, vestigial and impotent Expediency Council. Positions on all these modifications to the system vary, but there is general agreement (based on simple logic and bitter experience throughout the Khatami presidency) that for there ever to be actual reform within the Islamic Republic, those undemocratic institutions that repeatedly block progress need to first be done away with.

Faced with disillusionment brought on by a battered nation from Khomeini’s prolonged crisis of the Iran-Iraq War, men and women like Montazeri were finally given time to reflect upon the realities which the warped path of the Revolution had actually wrought. They realized that they had seriously fallen short of their aspirations for a more humane, and just nation when their pre-Revolutionary ideals met with the actual task of governing. (This was one of the deficits of the broader revolution, according to scholar Nikki R. Keddie. Many were so wrapped up in overthrowing the shah, not many had any idea what to do after Mohammad Reza Pahlavi finally abdicated the Peacock Throne — not many — except for Khomeini who had been developing his theory for decades and was more than happy to return from France and bear that ‘burden’). This pause at long last, after ten years of continued crisis after crisis, along with the death of Khomeini would allow for a reevaluation of the direction the Islamic Republic would take. It would first lead to a new Pragmatist faction, led by Rafsanjani under the mantle of his presidency in the early 1990’s, and in turn blossom in the the Reform movement under Khatami’s presidency in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. Montazeri was a spiritual guide in the background, giving these more liberal attitudes and moderation added weight and legitimacy. You could see his imprimatur stamped all over it. Since his death the core elite of the IRI have been dealing with the Legacy of Khomeini and interpreting his words across the political spectrum to fit their respective agendas (compare with the American Founding Fathers in this regard). But there have in fact been two competing legacies.

During the latter part of this time of maturation, from 1997-2003, Montazeri was put under house arrest (freed finally under Khatami’s plea to Supreme Leader Khamene’i) and has endured continued monitoring, threats, attacks, and a concerted campaign from the hardline media dismissing him as a “simple minded cleric” and instigating a political move to strip him of his robe. But, the fact remained, that among the collegiate fraternity of clerics; even those whom disagree vehemently (as is Shi’i tradition -- with its emphasis on ijtihad), politicians and extremist firebrand clerics had no authority to do this (though the clergy was greatly purged of “turbaned deceivers”, as Khomeini called them, in the early 1980’s). Until his death this weekend he remained the highest ranking marja’ in Iran, with only Grand Ayatollah Seyyid Ali Hosseini Sistani of Najaf, Iraq, outranking him in the Shi’i world.

His death, announced by his son Ahmad, of course spurred a few conspiracy theories. However; I don’t buy into them for reasons which will become clear later. It also appeared to be more of an initial reaction which has subsided. Despite being a thorn in the side of the leadership for decades, he was still set to be buried at the Fatemah shrine in Qom, the second holiest Shi’i shrine in Iran and thus a major pilgrimage site (charter pilgrimage bus tours often go from the Imam Reza shrine to this one). On Sunday, security forces were locking down Qom, shutting down communications, forbidding foreign media (those familiar with my past articles should be familiar with this drill by now),  in preparation for the intensified throngs, which already begin to burgeon during Moharram.

Mehdi Karoubi and Mir-Hossein Mousavi called for people to observe a public day of mourning, and come they did, as if they had to be directed, from major cities such as Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz and elsewhere. Anywhere from numbers in the tens of thousands (even corroborated by Ayandeh, which is associated with Mohsen Reza’i) to hundreds of thousands showed up and clashed with government loyalists who also came. Tear gas, shots fired (again, you know the drill). Of course, Kayhan (the IRI “Pravda”) reported that only 5,000 showed, and all newspapers in the country were forbidden from showing Montazeri’s picture on the front page. When mention was made of him, or his funeral, his titles were omitted and demonstrations were not mentioned. In contrast, BBC Persian’s wall-to-wall coverage of Montazeri got through IRI jamming attempts periodically, which were stepped up Sunday and particularly during the airing of Montazeri segments by IRI government monitors Monday (The New York Times reports; however, that they had to suspend broadcasts). Not only this, but even the sanctity of bast in Imam Hassan mosque was violated by security forces to prevent protesters from congregating there, another one of the ironies of the Islamic Republic, considering it was the sophisticated network of mosques in which Khomeini’s revolution was kept alive. It was the one place even the shah dared not transgress.

In Najafabad, hundreds of hamshahris (a Farsi term for fellow townsmen) proud of their hometown cleric, went out to the streets. Two buses were reported burned (I have yet to figure out the significance, if any, in this recurrent act, as bus drivers are historically Reform and have been active risking stiff reprisals for periodic strikes. It is probably more emotionally driven and I wish they’d knock it off, if it isn’t merely propaganda to smear them).

After protests, upon returning to Tehran, Mousavi’s car was repeatedly harrased and cut off by Basijis on motorbikes who even smashed the rear windows. If this is true, it would clarify and reverse any suspicions I had of his containment at his office the past two demonstrations being cynically choreographed. Similarly, the Montazeri’s home was put under heavy security (which for the Montazeri family, has pretty much been the status quo situation for a long time anyhow) and Basiji’s shouting pro-government slogans, and though they had a public funeral service, it was cut short by a couple hundred Basijis disrupting it and tearing up funeral banners (ironically, it is the conservative camp complaining of his death being “politicized” and calling pro-reformists “hypocrites” -- a politically charged word akin to ‘traitor’, if they did indeed use monafeqin). They decided to cancel the ceremony planned in the Fatemah mosque that evening, because the city of Qom had turned to “martial law” after mourners dispersed.

However; it is generally thought to have gone without major incident. The usual arrests and injuries here and there (I don’t mean to sound so jaded and callous; I hope they are alright and it is only a brief detainment) but the police also helped protect the crowd from the Basijis, again, according to Ayandeh. When Khamene’i was set to speak though, boos rang out (video) along with the ever familiar “Death to Dictator”. Other chants, apart from the usual, included, but were not limited to: “Dictator, this is your last message: The people of Iran are rising!”, “Oppressed Montazeri, you are with God now”, “Dictator, dictator, Montazeri is alive”, “Montazeri, you who spoke the truth! Your path will be followed”, “Innocent Montazeri, your path will be continued even if the dictator should rain bullets on our heads” and “Innocent Montazeri, Congratulations on your freedom!” (For more on the use of the movement’s clever use of Revolutionary slogans, here’s a BBC piece) I might also explain here that the shrine is named after Fatemah Ma’soumeh (sister of Imam Reza), the latter cognomen meaning ‘innocent’. In contrast Khamene’i would issue this passive-aggressive swipe, as reported by AFP,

“He was an accomplished theologian and a prominent teacher who spent a large part of his life for Imam’s (Khomeini’s) cause,” Khamenei said in a statement carried by state television’s website. He also asked divine forgiveness for Montazeri over a “difficult ordeal” that the late cleric had undergone, alluding to his fallout with Khomeini.

The White House issued its condolences through National Security Council spokesman Michael Hammer, “Our thoughts and prayers are with his family and those who seek to exercise the universal rights and freedoms that he so consistently advocated.”

Montazeri’s other son Saeed said Sunday that, “I think one of the main reasons [for his death] was his grief for the post-election events which troubled my father a lot”. Indeed, these came even in the form of a fatwa, denouncing Ahmadinejad’s election as illegitimate and the violent crackdown, saying in late August that the the government was neither Islamic nor a republic, and at the end of November saying the Basij were “in the path of Satan”. In reference to students tearing up Khomeini’s picture during Student Day on December 4th, he remarked,

“The late Ayatollah Imam Khomeini was a very important man. But, he was not ma’soom [sinless] and had erred many times. He himself never claimed to be ma’soom. Therefore, there is no need to make an issue of this [tearing and burning his poster].”

For his part, Hassan Khomeini, grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini said that “[he] spent many years of his honorable life on the path of advancing the high goals of Islam and the Islamic revolution”. The Khomeini progeny are a prime example of Montazeri’s call to return to the original promise and opportunity provided by the Revolution of their namesake. Just as their grandfather was the figurehead for one popular uprising, so has Montazeri been the patron of another.

Shirin Ebadi, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate (though the hardware went ‘missing’ for a bit) had this moving reflection,

“I call you father because I learned from you how to defend the oppressed without using violence against the oppressor. I learned from you that being silent is helping the oppressor. Father, I learned much from you, although I never [got the chance to] show my appreciation for being your child and student. Father, forgive us.”

Grand Ayatollah Ali Hossein Montazeri’s legacy will be that he gave up the chance for power out of conscience, was not afraid to speak against power, no matter what threats came his way. It is true, he was not liberal by Western standards, and although he spoke out for the rights of religious minorities, even the unrecognized Bahá’ís, he still adhered to the fundamentalist Shi’i view of najas (non-Muslims being ritually impure); but said they may make themselves “pure through chaste, Muslim-like, behavior.” This, compared to Khomeini and hard-line clerics today, makes him downright progressive in comparison. For more on religious discrimination in Iran, this is an excellent article (though I will warn you it’s National Review). If we are to be concerned about political dissidents and the plight of women, we should show the same for religious minorities. (Here’s an essay on the same subject by Marina Nemat [PDF], while I’m on the topic). His courage has inspired those like another dissident cleric, Grand Ayatollah Hossein Kazememeyni Boroujerdi, who is still imprisoned after three years for advocating the separation of mosque and state, Grand Ayatollah Sane’i (who is the closest a Reformist cleric can come to filling the spiritual aspect of the giant vacuum Montazeri will leave, in my view), men like Mehdi Karoubi, and most importantly the Green Movement itself. From earlier this month in one of his last statements, this is what he had this to say of it,

This movement is the accurate reflection and representation of the justified demands of the majority that have surfaced over many years. While it has faced a violent reaction and vehement hostility from the hardliner faction of the state, its domestic and foreign achievements are undeniable. Inside Iran, this movement has succeeded in institutionalizing a tolerant culture for demanding the rights of a large number of people, which were ignored during the election [process] and the events that followed. In addition, this movement has also prevailed in exposing the violent nature of the radical and the oppressive. Of course, to achieve this, it has paid a high price, which shows that the people will not be swayed until they attain the rights they are entitled to. Death, intimidation, threats, detainments, arrests, illegal and non-religious trials, heavy and unjust convictions for political activists and freedom seekers, as well as false and misleading propaganda – none of this has influenced the people’s will and determination. Outside Iran, the movement has succeeded in drawing international attention – especially that of developed societies and human rights organizations – to the oppression it faces as well as its rightful demands. From a political [perspective], [the movement] has presented the real power of nationhood to the world.

The continuance of the calendar demonstrations were already set for Ashura, before his passing. And this comes on the heels of the Revolutionary Court announcing it will try 12 prison officials for the deaths of three protesters (I can’t help but wonder if this will be like the post 18 Tir trials when all but one security officers were acquitted, the one left, sentenced for disobeying orders to beat protesters -- not 100% on the details here though, I’m woefully behind on transferring a stack of book notes to my computer). I had been planning on an article for that. So, this will by far be one of my worst articles to date, rushed as I was by this unforeseeable event. Needless to say, I shall be getting into more into what happens with the vacuum he’s left, the powerful symbolism of Moharram, remark more on the status of the Green Movement (which, by the way, have been guaranteed they won’t be reprimanded for carrying the green banners by Police commander Azizollah Rajabzadeh, according to Farda -- I will get into this later!), and hopefully have a more coherently crafted piece. I will but mention this: Montazeri’s death, happened to fall the week before Ashura. As some may recall, the Shi’i mourning cycle occurs on the third, seventh, and the big one (arba’een) on the fortieth days after passing. As Shirin Sadeghi notes,

In a bizarre twist of fate, Montazeri’s death coincides with the most important date on the Shiite calendar: Ashura. His haftom (literally: seventh day of passing — a significant date of mourning for Shiites) will fall exactly on the holy day of Ashura when Iranians are encouraged by the government to parade into the streets to recognize their fallen martyrs.

The symbolism just got a whole lot deeper. This is why I don’t buy the conspiracy theory. The intelligence services have been sloppy at times, but I could not think of worse premeditated timing (I promised I’d get back to it!) to assassinate him. I think they also hearkened back to the conspiracy theories surrounding Ayatollah Taleghani’s death in 1979 (part of reading Iran is being aware of its culturally historical references). Remarking more soberly on the implications of Montazeri’s death whilst noting that he may be more powerful in death as a martyr to galvanizing the movement, Juan Cole made this brilliant analogy to the other effect,

The regime will breathe a sigh of relief, since Montazeri helped craft the doctrine of the guardianship of the Jurisprudent, which the current government interprets as clerical dictatorship. But Montazeri maintains that that outcome was never Khomeini’s intent. It is sort of as though there was a living disciple of Jesus around who insisted that he never intended the pope to be infallible. Montazeri was a powerful living witness to an alternative form of Shiite government, one with a human face. The hardliners such as Khamenei and Ahmadinejad will be delighted to have that voice silenced.

Other Iran News Updates

These are what I had been planning to get out of the way the week before Ashura. So, instead of remarking much on them, I’ll sort of just knock ‘em off one-by-one.

• Iran Losing Clout in the Arab World. Even Hassan Nasrallah was getting a little unsettled by the violent oppression.
• A study abstract which claims Ahmadinejad losing support in rural areas.
• The government tried to shame a male student by dressing him in a maghna’eh and chador. In response, men from around the country dressed up in hejab and posted their pictures in the comments sections of pro-government news sites.
• A recommended interview with Karim Sadjadpour, from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, on the efficacy of sanctions.
• Amnesty International calls for probe into human rights abuses [heartwrenching video of a raped young woman who escaped to Turkey]. Here’s a release from the Amnesty International site on the abuses.
• The jihad on makeup! (to paraphrase Mary Matalin)
• On the whole Iraqi well hooplah, heralded by Huffy as an impending war, see Juan Cole, and for some (much needed) historical perspective, go here. Bloomberg also had some relevant insights. Also, I was trying to say this during the hikers thing (who are promised a “speedy trial” in most recent news). GPS doesn’t help a damn bit when both countries have different ideas where the border is.
• Remember the hacked Predator drones? Iran may have had a hand in it. And they may have hacked Twitter too!
• While I’m on the subject of IRI mischief, Houthi rebels in Yemen (Exporting the Revolution redux and screwing with the Saudis again). No wonder they got disinvited from the GCC -- that, and Bahrain and the UAE weren’t too amused by the yacht incident, I imagine. Oh wait, no, I’m pretty certain. It really doesn’t take an analyst at a thinktank to figure these things out sometimes.
• Awesome op-ed by Richard Cohen on why Obama is doing the right thing with Iran. Mehdi Karoubi, in an interview published this morning, bolsters this. Admiral Mullen’s recent comments slightly complicate this, but it was still far more measured than we might have seen under the Bush administration. If this is part of the concerted case being built to invade Iran à la Iraq, I still fail to see it. But that’s another topic altogether for me to thoughtfully dismantle.

Well, that’s it. My bookmarks get pretty full after a short while, and I only selected a few. The above section was to be among my content in my preview of the upcoming Ashura demonstrations. So, until next week, to get everyone in the Shi’i holiday mood --

A final mention of thanks. Some of these links would not be possible but for my fellow IRI apologist slayers at HP. If you happen to cross upon this, you know who you are.

* * *

“Independence is being free of foreign intervention and freedom is giving people the freedom to express their opinions. Not being put in prison for every protest one utters.”

- Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri (1922-2009)

16 Azar, or National Student Day is a commemoration of December 7th, 1953, when three students at Tehran University were killed after protesting the visit of Vice President Nixon to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, seen as a congratulation for the coup d’état against Mohammad Mossadegh and the return of the shah upon the Peacock Throne barely months before. While chanting “death to the shah”, security forces of the shah stormed the campus and brutally attacked students. The day after, they moved in on the faculty of engineering, which was seen as the locus from whence the demonstrations were organized. There they opened fire with machine guns and killed three students, Mostafa Bozorgnia, Ahmad Ghandchi, and Mehdi Shariatrazavi (for more on this event, see this fabulous article by Muhammad Sahimi).

Naturally, this event, which was a long observed anniversary, was seized upon by the new Revolutionary government of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a national holiday for, what else; stoking anti-American fervor. But, after the 18 Tir student uprising  of 1999, with the storming of Tehran University dormitories by Ansar-e Hezbollah thugs and the demonstrations, injuries, deaths, disappearances and mass arrests that followed, it was now irretrievably an anniversary to be co-opted by the Reformist movement. This is the background to this monthly round of what has been termed the “calendar battle”; that is, using national holidays to take to the streets, bypassing the un-Constitutional restrictions on their right to assembly.

The preparation for this round was undertaken weeks prior by both sides. Campus morals enforcers, known as herasat, targeted young men with hair too long and women wearing too much color and showing too much of their figure, including hair. In addition, they’d beefed up their campus Basij organization and enlisted pro-Ahmadinejad student informers to keep watch for any with opposition sympathies, even taking photos, and turning them in for “suspicious” behavior. Over a hundred prominent student leaders were arrested or expelled (with a couple going on hunger strike and one whose body was found a few days ago, according to a Reformist source). Another less severe practice (in effect before the recent troubles of the summer) has been to give politically active students “stars”, upon which receiving their third, they are banned from all universities, so writes Shirin Mohammadi. Nevertheless, the universities remain hotbeds of activism, as they were during the shah’s reign.

Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i was the former director of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence, (VEVAK) under Ahmadinejad’s first term who was made Prosecutor General of Iran after some mild controversy in the wake of the protests during July by Ayatollah Sadegh Larijani, the head of the Judiciary (this post is reserved only for mujtahids, or clerics versed in shari’a — wonderful, no? knowledge of secular law isn’t necessary). Mohseni-Eje’i said last week that “from now on, we will show no mercy” and that “families are responsible, too, if their children are arrested,” plus numerous warnings issued throughout the state media echoing this following refrain from the police, “any gathering or ceremony outside the designated places will be considered illegal and police will take necessary steps.”

The day before the scheduled protests (which also happened to be the Shi’i holiday of Eid-e Ghadir), more students were detained, Reformist papers (many of which continue to be banned) warned of “sowing seeds of division”, a forced confession from journalist Abdollah Momeni aired on TV, foreign press were texted that their licenses were being suspended for three days (in addition to already being limited to the confines of their offices), internet and cell phone service was shut down, and 29 mothers were arrested for mourning their children martyred during the unrest.

Of course, those “designated places” mentioned by the police above were the campuses themselves. They were locked down, pro-government banners covering the view within to outside observers, cordoned off completely by police to prevent anyone on the streets joining up. Essentially, they were treated as lepers on islands. Obviously a tactical move by the regime to contain a venting, much as Mir-Hosein Mousavi has been treated. On the morning of National Student Day, 30 to 40 plainclothes Basijis on motorbikes showed up outside his office at the Academy of Fine Arts to prevent him from joining the protests. He reportedly said to them, “if you are on a mission to kill, beat or threaten me, go ahead,” reported his own Kalameh website. After a few hours, they left. This is what also reportedly happened on 13 Aban (sometimes I wonder if this is all choreographed, though). His, wife, Zahra Rahnavard, did attend a protest to speak. She was shadowed by Basiji women, and, when she confronted them, they denied following her, then insults were exchanged, whereupon they escorted her away and pepper sprayed her face from point-blank range, according to Gooya News. Another source said she had been prevented from speaking by the din of angry demonstrators.

The government wasn’t the only one issuing intriguingly brazen statements. In addition to Karoubi’s and Grand Ayatollah Montazeri’s bold comments throughout this unrest, Mousavi has stepped up his rhetoric, to the surprise of myself. In this, he gives credence to the changing nature of the movement, of which he is in fact accommodating (and sheltering from stiffer reprisals in my view), but certainly not the impetus for. Even back during the campaign this was largely the case, where his platform seemed led and dictated largely by his followers. Why he might succeed in being a political survivor, is what Khatami lacked, credentials. Khatami was an unknown, an obscure cleric whose highest position was that of a liberal Minister of Culture. Mousavi ’s résumé is more prestigious. He was Prime Minister (and last to hold the office before it was abandoned and replaced by the position of First Vice President) from 1981-1989, is member of the Expediency Council and Supreme Council for the Cultural Revolution, and has deep ashnas (connections) which are ever important in Persian culture, especially in regards to the power structure. Hardliners in the Majles (parliament) and more recently Mohseni-Eje’i have talked of arresting Mousavi. The problem with arresting  and trying him, Karoubi and Khatami (and do I ever wish they would be that stupid!), is unleashing massive demonstrations like in June. The other conundrum for the Hardline leadership is that more so than the other two, removing Mousavi would be like removing a tricky Jenga block from the base of the IRI establishment. His main advisor, Ali Reza Beheshti, is also the son of a pivotal Revolutionary Grand Ayatollah who was assassinated by the Mohajedin-e Khalq. Never say never, but this is about as politically bullet-proof in the IRI as you can get.

Mousavi, for the Supreme Leader and the Hardliners, is much trickier to sideline than Khatami and his associates were, even though the latter was president. Perhaps because of this, and this is proof that this movement is not going away and has broadened its purpose, he said recently in an internet statement, “They ask us to forget about the election results as if the problem is only the elections … The problem of our people is not who the head of the government is or who is not. The problem is that this few are bolstering their egos to the shame of a great nation.” In other words,  da’va sar-e een nist, that’s not what this fight is about. He’s making an implicit attack on Ahmadinejad, Pasdaran and even Khamene’i, who said questioning the results of the election was a sin. Ahmadinejad, by the way, has in fact probably been muzzled, as I had suspected. Another comment like calling the protesters a “bunch of rubbish,” could bring real meaning to the Farsi idiom, which translates more literally as chips and shavings (tinder).

Add to Mousavi’s statement that of Rafsanjani’s in Mashhad (an important pilgrimage city in northeastern Iran) at a Ghadir speech, “If the people of Iran want us to govern them, then we may stay. If not, then we should step aside.” In terms of both Farsi ambiguity and IRI-speak, this could be construed as a most direct warning that the rift in Iran has become so potentially volatile that it threatens rending the nation asunder, and Rafsanjani is prepared to go down with it. It also signals intent? Grand Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi has recognized a need for national reconciliation, as well, “we should sit together and negotiate and the precondition to that is the creation of a calm atmosphere,” he has said. Of course, the state media organs downplay all of this and insist there is no problem. I do not wish to suggest that the IRI’s demise is imminent. Even in the heat of the June and July protests, I had little doubt whom would prevail (though I kept it largely to myself, not wanting to dampen anyone’s enthusiasm, including my own shred of hope), at least in the short term. But, while my optimism remains cautious, this is the longest challenge and threat to Khamene’i’s power in his rule as Supreme Leader. And there have been red lines crossed, which had never before been trespassed without severe consequences. The envelope continues  to get pushed.

On the events of Student Day, students demonstrated on campuses across Iran, estimated at 10,000 by one source, though honestly, a number is impossible to ascertain. Cities where significant opposition gathered included: Arak, Gilan, Hamedan, Hormozgan, Ilam, Isfahan, Karaj, Kerman, Kermanshah, Mashhad, Najafabad, Qazvin, Rasht, Shahr Kord, Shiraz, Tabriz, Tehran, Yasouj, and Zanjan. The night before some of these cities echoed and shook with the rooftop cries of “Allaho Akbar”, while during the next day, the chants included some familiar standards with new ones put into the mix -- targeting the Basij and Khamene’i with more singular focus and ferocity: “death to the dictator,” “students would rather die and never put up with suffering”, “Basiji go home — no free meal today,” “get lost, mercenary,” “what happened to the oil money? It was spent on the Basiji,” “guns, tanks, Basijis are no longer effectual,” “death to the oppressor, whether it’s the shah or the leader!”, “Khamene’i should know, he is on his way out,” “Khamene’i is a murderer, his Velayat-ship is void,” “pathetic dictator, the game goes on”, “our curse, our shame, our incompetent leader!”, “We’re not [like] the people of Kufa to stand behind Yazid,” “my martyred brother, I will avenge your blood,” “the cry of our nation: politics is separate from religion!”, and “this government is Fascist, it must stop at some point.” As if this didn’t drive the point home, Iranian flags sans the stylized martyr’s tulip spelling Allah in the center were waved, and, instead of being used as “shields” like they were during the big Azadi Square demonstration on June 15th, portraits of the Supreme Leader were being burnt and ripped apart. Ahmadinejad’s, as well (pffft, almost forgot about you).

The students outnumbered the police and Basijis in some cases, forcing the security forces to draw back, content to take photographs of the ’scofflaws’ from the sidelines to be used later. Undaunted, many clashes were inevitable, and were sometimes said to have been instigated by students. It could not be limited to the students, though. The Washington Post reported one occasion where, “Passengers riding buses on Enghelab Street, which runs alongside the sprawling campus, joined in chants against the government as security forces beat people waiting at bus stops, witnesses said”. People from the streets also tried to gather and join up with the students (on 16 Azar Street, for one, the only entrance open to the students), but there was a full presence throughout the capital city. One person described it as almost martial law. At the end of the day 169 men and 39 women were arrested. Many more were dispersed by batons, shots in the air, tear gas, and paint balls (!), but flash crowds frustrated the police and all demonstrators were hailed with a deafening peal of honking horns from passing cars. There are no deaths reported. The government forces have been careful and efficient in this regard, which also is another conundrum for them. They are conscious that an unrestrained bloody crackdown could be the accelerant which burns their house down. They seem to be trying to neutralize agitators through quiet assassinations, and achieve a certain containment through arrests and intimidation. I wouldn’t be surprised if we find out more “suspicious deaths” are occurring than we know about right now at a later time, though. Then again, maybe I’ll be proven wrong. I certainly don’t wish anyone’s death.

All these student’s views, I should caution, very well may not represent the wider view of the Green Movement. There is some worry, that I share, that a more aggressive movement, aside from inviting reprisals from the government, might alienate what is really a broad coalition of opposition which runs the gamut in goals from mild reform, to overthrow of the whole government. I know I promised a more detailed analysis of what exactly the Green Movement is, but I’m asking my dear readers for an extension on that assignment. I’m trying to be thoughtful about it, and not project what I want them to be about. I also have the task of sifting through many, many differing opinions, anecdotal evidence and dubious polls (as all polls in Iran are). What I do know, is that it is evolving, and graffiti like this has been springing up in cities.

What is also new, is that the Kurds appear to be getting into the mix. According to Juan Cole, light armor have been dispatched to quell the situation in Iranian Kordestan (which has a long history with Tehran) after the region being relatively quiet for some time. Kurds joined in protests in the provincial capital of Sanandaj, which sent alarm bells a’ ringing. This is a region which itself declared independence following the shah’s flight and has continued to be a thorn in Tehran’s side ever since, much as Kurds have been in Ankara’s and Baghdad’s, as well. The Kurdish regions of Iran have been victim to a series of outrages by heavy handed Iranian armed forces. On this note, a Kurd studying in Tehran went missing (this along with the case of Ehsan Fattahian, mentioned in my last article). The Azeris are also becoming more active (and the Azeri are a driving force behind a good deal of revolution in Iranian history). I even saw a claim that the Qashqa’i tribe has threatened to move into Shiraz (maybe someone is playing me on historical themes?!). If this is all true, taken with the ongoing Balouchi problems (and one reason for strained relationships with Pakistan), it would mean that these ethnic groups with long-held grievances sense a weakened central government. They aren’t the only ones though. Even outside Iran, the Arab world, there appears to be increasing disenchanted, including Lebanese Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah, sounding concerns. And speaking of beyond Iran’s borders, not only is the IRI stepping up surveillance internally, but the diaspora is reportedly being sent anonymous threatening e-mails and more. Is it from official elements within the IRI? I’m not sure, but I’ve seen enough of this type of behavior on Iranian site message boards, and at the Huffington Post to be fairly convinced intelligence is watching and has a cadre of bloggers to disseminate misinformation, choosing more often than not to merely dissemble and spread a general fog over all discussions on the political turmoil in Iran.

Instrumental to this fog is their effort to suppress the free press. One of many international lists the sorry IRI tops is that it is second only to the People’s Republic of China in jailed journalists, many of which who have been guests of the state in Ward 209, Evin Prison. Among the more recent are Shapour Kazemi, brother of Zahra Rahnavard who has been sentenced to a year for participation in “illegal protests”. Kambiz Norouzi, with the Association of Iranian Journalists, sentenced to two years prison and seventy-four lashes. Hengameh Shahidi, six years and three months. The harshest sentence so far is against Saeed Leilaz with no less than nine years. And Ahmad Zeidabadi, who was tried on Student Day itself, keeps having his sentence increased, though I heard five years of exile within Iran (Khuzestan is traditionally the Iranian “Siberia”, though I’m not certain where they send them anymore -- though it’s generally hot, desolate, and sandy as a rule).

The following day on the 8th (17th, Anno Persico) there were reports of renewed clashes. No one is sure yet what precipitated these. Either it was students walking out on classes to protest their classmates detained, or security forces stormed the campus to cleanup those they hadn’t gotten the day before, reminiscent of fifty-six years ago. An undetermined amount have been arrested and detained. On the 8th, a humorous event took place, as well. Masoumeh Ebtekar, the former hostage taker (“Sister Mary”), at a Tehran Council meeting congratulated the success of 16 Azar, and passed out green candy to celebrate. Pavin, Ahmadinejad’s sister was there, and Masoumeh had an intermediary give her some expressly because it was green. Pavin refused, of course.

With that I’ll mention another chant heard on the 7th, “support, support, brave Iranians.” I would like to concur with what Trita Parsi and Dokhi Fassahian said in a recent article on The Huffington Post,

Looking at Iran solely from a nuclear prism proved disastrous for the Bush administration. The Obama administration will fare no better. It needs to swiftly reinvigorate its human rights approach to Iran and begin giving significant prominence to this issue.

They and I feel it is a mistake for President Obama not to speak out more forcibly condemning the human rights abuses in Iran. The sense is that Obama and the State Department don’t want to sabotage nuclear talks, or fall into Hardliner’s hands. Well, Kenneth Pollack, who was once privy to these types of policy decisions in the Clinton administration reflected upon them years later, and the lesson he took away was that if they bolt because of that kind of pretense, they were going to probably find another one. In any case, it is no more meddling than their weekly chants of “Death to America” and screeds against our foreign policy in the Middle East and everything else they accuse the West of. If they can dish it out, they should be able to take it. Ah, if Sarah Palin were a country, I’ve got one that fits her personality perfectly… I would propose a subtly crafted statement, or brief segment of a speech to be prepared, which acknowledges again that we have our mistakes, but to gently remind them of their own people and their duty to them. In fact this has been my whole problem with the nuclear obsession. It’s important, but it took the bravery of the Iranian opposition to pull our single-minded heads out of our asses and pay attention to them once again. I know it would probably be against US protocol as it stands, but quoting someone like this from Grand Ayatollah Montazeri would be apropos: “Independence is being free of foreign intervention and freedom is giving people the freedom to express their opinions. Not being put in prison for every protest one utters.” Of course, Montazeri has spent enough years under house arrest and I’m not sure he has many more. So, there’s always Ali Shariati, who is long dead, “Don’t believe what a government says if that government is the only entity that has the right of expression.” But hey, Obama, your call. Sa’di always works.

A few extra notes:

• Mohseni-Ejei has summoned Mehdi Rafsanjani to return to Iran (he’s been in self-imposed exile since the elections) to answer corruption charges, brought ultimately by Ahmadinejad though not directly (it’s uncivilized, things are always inferred, or you beat a guy in jail to point the finger). While I don’t suppose any Rafsanjani is clean, Mehdi did make an interesting counter-accussation of Ahmadinejad embezzling more. — This is another problem with cracks in such a tight-knit group, they’ve likely got lot’s of dirt on each other. Who knows, for example, all that Mousavi has got on Khamene’i as Prime Minister under his Presidency?

• Moharram will begin December 18th, with Ashura on the 27th. This could get really interesting!

• Until then a song by famed Ostad Mohammad Reza Shajarian, master of Persian classical, whom has refused to perform for the government or let them use his music for state propaganda. With words from late poet Fereydoon Moshiri, he wrote this song, called “Language of Fire” in honor of the Green Movement:

The language of fire and iron is the game of fury and bloodshed.
It is the language of Genghis Khan.
Come, sit down, talk, hear.
Perhaps the light of humanity will get through to your heart, too.

For story and full lyrics click on this link.

The students have become the teachers, and are writing their own history.

Since the 13 Aban demonstrations nearly a month ago, the international nuclear debate has been ratcheted up, and the domestic scene of the Islamic Republic of Iran keeps lurching further into the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ blood-soaked hands. From Maziar Bahari’s article, written after his experiences of being arrested and interrogated in Evin Prison (for being on The Daily Show),

The Revolutionary Guards are a schizophrenic bunch, plagued by both deep insecurities and a superiority complex.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (henceforth referred to by its common Iranian appellation, Pasdaran) is ramping up its role in internal intelligence and security forces, including an internet unit to monitor the opposition online. Pasdaran Chief Mohammad Ali Jafari said, “Today is the era of soft warfare, and we must be able to carry out our duties in confronting soft threats. This requires organizational and structural changes, and the changes that have taken place in the past one and two years are in connection to this development.” This is all in conjunction with the diminution of the traditional Intelligence Ministry (VEVAK or MOIS), successor to SAVAK, and the alarming consolidation of power into its own ranks, a pattern begun when higher ranking individuals in VEVAK were moved and shielded from Majles investigations into the Serial Murders.

The Serial Murders were a decade ago. This is now. Ramin Pourandarjani was a doctor who had testified to a parliamentary hearing on his experiences while serving his postgraduate requirements as a physician at Kahrizak detention center in Tehran, the site of some of the most horrific rapes, tortures and deaths in the immediate aftermath of the post-election unrest. He was found dead on November 10th. Kahrizak had been shut down (temporarily) on orders of Khamene’i after it had become a total fiasco by August, but still Pourandarjani was arrested following his testimony and warned to keep quiet. There he had been witness to, among others, Mohsen Rouholamini, son of adviser to conservative pragmatist candidate Mohsen Reza’i, who officially died from a case of “meningitis” and not the repeated blows to the head witnessed in his testimony. In a similar response to Pourandarjani’s death, the government announced first that he had committed suicide, then apparently that he had succumbed to a heart attack — at the age of 26. Now I hear off the wires that it was a “delivery salad laced with an overdose of blood pressure medication.”

Once I would have called this sort of thing VEVAK, but the sloppiness of its rollout all bespeaks more the possibility of a transitioning IRGC counter-intelligence, or perhaps the opposite consideration, a VEVAK now partly out of the loop. That is pure conjecture from someone woefully unqualified to make such judgments though — call it me thinking out loud and fumbling for more info. Truth is, ham-handedness is one of the regime’s twistedly endearing qualities. The case of Ebrahim Mehtari, who was beaten, anally raped by a foreign object then dumped on the road in the night bound, did point the finger at Pasdars, though. He has just been reported as seeking asylum in America by Iranian state-run media Press TV as of December 1st. For more cases like this, see this page. Also of note, is the curious case of Ehsan Fattahian.

For those who say that putting Khalid Sheikh Mohammed up for Federal Trial in a civilian court in New York City is “dangerous”, then at least consider the message it would send to the world, Iran in particular, of America standing firm in our founding principles, and not fudging them when it isn’t convenient. Further political detainees from June are being charged with everything from six years in prison, like Omid Lavasani, unaffiliated web designer for MirHosein.com, to a member of the Mousavi campaign, Alireza Aushouri, sentenced to 76 lashes for charges of “propaganda against the regime by participating in June 15 demonstrations, conspiracy against national security and disturbing public order,” according to Kambiz Nowroozi.

On the Rafsanjani front, he has been conspicuously absent from Tehran’s Friday sermon (khutba), most remarkably missing the Eid Qurban (‘Eid al-Adha) ceremony, or Festival of Sacrifice. He has said this is due to four conditions laid out in his last sermon on July 17^th. He called for immediate release of political prisoners, aid for those injured, redress for Grand Ayatollahs and clerics insulted, and differing viewpoints allowed in state media. Needless to say, none have happened. I still don’t trust him though. As Kenneth Pollack put it in The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America,

[I]t would be dangerous to ascribe altruistic motives to a man so famous for his corruption, his political expediency, and his own willingness to condone violence and repression.

Not a decade ago this is the same figure who was on the exact opposite end of the fence (or pulpit, rhetorically) regarding the student protests of that brutal crackdown. Has he found his true moderate self? Perhaps the the pragmatist, through the eyes of his grown children (whom are children of exceeding privilege, make no doubt) realizes the Islamic Republic cannot survive on this self-destructive course any longer, as reflected by him saying: “If we separate people from the system, this will damage it.” But he’s also long been believed to covet the position Supreme Leader for himself, and motivated by better relations with the West, thus greater business opportunities. With a master political strategist and pillar of the IRI ruling élite, it may be a combination of all of these things. He’s not called the shark (kouseh, also meaning ‘beardless’) for nothing. On the other hand, he seems to be trying to frame this absence as his own decision. During the June protests, his former-lawmaker daughter, Faezah, was briefly detained. Alireza Nourizadeh, of the Center for Arab-Iranian Studies in London contends, “They cannot wipe him out, but they are trying to quarantine him.” That he has no longer had his once-weekly meetings with Khamene’i since the initial unrest is another clue it may not have been entirely his decision to make.

Now, to pivot back to the third point of Rafsanjani’s demands. In light that only one Grand Ayatollah sent Ahmadinejad a congratulation letter, and recent squabbling between the clerical establishment and Khamene’i over the Eid-e Fetr date for the breaking of Ramadan (fasting is begun and broken at the sighting of new moons. What would seem to be straightforward is complicated by competing clerics and, in the case of Iran, its resentment with the Saudis for being the protectors of Islam’s holiest sites), the conservative Qom Seminary Scholars Association  is rumored to be preparing a list of new Grand Ayatollahs sympathetic to hard-liner ideology and even hinting at demoting others (a dubious move of questionable validity within the Ulama). Not only this, but 6,000 new Basiji centers are to be set up in elementary schools, to re-instill “Revolutionary” values back into the youth. Mohammad-Saleh Jokar, head of this effort, said, “Students of this age are more open to influence than older students, and for this reason we want to promote and establish the ideas of the revolution and the Basij.” I am reminded of Shah Mohammad Reza’s own favoring of politically sympathetic ayatollahs to the ire of others (like Khomeini), and the White Revolution, when he instituted a “religion corps” to compliment his mission to spread literacy to villages and to spread his new state-sanction brand of Shi’ism. In addition to reinvigorated elementary school indoctrination, there will be (yet another) review and possible purging of any professors left who aren’t entirely rote and whom are quite likely somewhat knowledgeable and qualified in their field, to be replaced with political appointees passing the purity test (and already part of the reason for so many young Iranians with higher education not being able to find employment). For more on what this may look like, refer to Azar Nafisi’s Reading Lolita in Tehran. Yes, this is all part of the Pasdaran’s new campaign, mentioned before, dubbed the “soft war”, where according to Brigadier General Muhammad Bagher-Zolghadr, “the enemy is everywhere” — you know, those sentient beings thinking for themselves and calling bullshit on your rigid, authoritarian and stifling vision of Islam; a skewed view of a mullahtocracy which is distributing free filtering software to citizens out of the kindness of their hearts to protect their impressionable minds from Western lies and decadence (I’m not kidding, I’m paraphrasing state-media propaganda which is that farcically funny).

Perhaps it is in this light that such a puerile act as the seizure of Human Right’s lawyer Shirin Ebadi’s Nobel Peace Prize medal (and Légion d’honneur) was taken from her bank’s safe deposit box. Iranian government spokesmen have denied the charge, but, the government’s line has also long been that it is a tool of the West supporting enemies of the Revolution. In any case, who are you more likely to believe? It would also seem a warning, along with assault on her husband, Javad Tavassolian, freezing his pension and bank account, and other threats to the rest of her family. A TIME article echoes my suspicions to their motives on this:

By censoring newspapers that once carried her articles, blocking news websites that reported on her work and creating a climate of intimidation in which Ebadi would scarcely risk making a public address in Iran, the government had succeeded in reducing her voice to a rare whisper most often heard from abroad.

Indeed, the hard-line government has succeeded largely in silencing Mousavi and Khatami, whom are IRI insiders themselves, let’s never forget. Their current demands of going back to the original draft of the Constitution are indeed dramatic, but they are not small ‘r’ revolutionary leaders (now when Rafsanjani suggested in 1989 that the Constitution had been written too quickly and was incomplete, that did take balls). Khatami already demonstrated a decade earlier he was unfit to mobilize his very healthy, broad movement against a beleaguered hard-line camp in retreat. He was subsequently ham-strung in his second term when they struck back with all the methods they had at their disposal. No, these two are figureheads handpicked by the conservative Guardian Council, vessels through which the movement legitimizes itself within the fickle labyrinth that is political dissent in the Islamic Republic. Karoubi remains the only one from the elections to be undaunted and cross traditional red lines. Him, and longtime thorn in Khamene’i’s side, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. Posting a collection of both their statements would be an entertaining post in itself.

Most recently, five British yachtsmen were sailing to Dubai on a Bahraini yacht in preparation for a race when en route they allegedly crossed into Iranian waters (which I always find suspect, since they not only take the name of the Persian Gulf very seriously, but sometimes literally in their minds!). Instead of being escorted back into international waters (indeed, I would appreciate a naval expert to fill me in on proper protocol), The Pasdaran Navy (whom I would describe as Basijis in speedboats) took them mainland for questioning. There were usual threats from the Foreign Ministry and implications they might be the newest diplomatic bargaining chips along with the three American hikers still detained. It was my initial reaction that this would fit into a long pattern of hard-line government behavior; considered especially in the wake of the IAEA’s censure over their Fordo site. But, another missed angle is the evidence of the implementation of the Pasdaran Navy’s new strategic restructuring, giving it preference over the conventional Iranian Navy in the gulf, in full display for us. However; pragmatists among the leadership apparently won out on the diplomatic course to take, and the sailors are being released. The Pasdaran issued this statement: “After carrying out an investigation and interrogation of the five British sailors, it became clear that their illegal entry was a mistake.” Oh, well, fair enough, you might argue. But, the day before, several radical voices were demanding the return for trial of Arash Hejazi, the man who had come to Neda Agha-Soltan’s side and tried to save her after she was shot, and whom is now back in England studying at Oxford after surreptitiously fleeing Iran, wisely.  Women sympathetic to hard-liners were also preparing a demonstration outside the British Embassy in Tehran Wednesday, December 2^nd. This could have become another international row like back in 2007 with the Royal Navy personnel. I wonder if they weren’t overzealous, got a call from command after returning to port, and issued that statement like a school child castigated and forced to say they’re sorry. Either that, or someone in the ruling circle impressed upon the Supreme Leader, that they may have really overstepped their bounds. The IRI being self-aware of its own tragic absurdity? I know, it does sound loopy, but it does occasionally happen. I also think reigniting tensions with Bahrain may have been a big factor.

Where this maturity still is not happening though is over the nuclear issue (which I might add, is also being transferred into the hands of the Pasdaran – see if you can spot the pattern). Now, it is not my intention to delve too deeply into that here. If you don’t know my position, it is the following. I do not trust the IRI. But the hysteria it induces in the West (Israel in particular) is not constructive either. And the double standards are not lost on the Iranian people. We, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are also the five leading nuclear armed states, with a combined total of warheads at around 23,000. Furthermore, we’ve turned a blind eye to non-NPT nations such as India, Pakistan, and yes, Israel. I’m sure they also took note of North Korea’s breakout, as well. However; my view, along with many others, including Juan Cole, is that they are seeking a Japan option. Whether unfair or not (and it was a fairly minor infraction, not to say the Iranians don’t drag their feet and play coy), they were censured. Part of me thinks this may have been partly to do with their cold feet on the originally proposed Russian deal (which as I said in my first article, is the victim of internal politics as much, if not more, than the international climate). For more on the complexities (which I’ll admit go over my head often), Sharmine Narwani wrote one of the better articles I’ve seen on the situation, at duh-duh-duh, The Huffington Post. It is the histrionic way in which Iran has reacted for a slap on the wrist, threatening to withdraw from the NPT, and build new enrichment facilities (which they don’t have the resources for), that is oh so, IRI. Take this quote from Ahmadinejad,

[Western countries] need us more than we need them. It is psychological warfare and isolating Iran is impossible. Any finger which is about to pull the trigger will be cut off.

And what always happens is that we in the West freak out over such outlandish delusions and they feel validated. My proper response to this acting out? A collective “bitch, please”. But the West is not much better. How many times have I heard the old poorly translated Khomeini line about ” the Zionist regime vanishing from the page of history” conflated with Ahmadinejad’s Holocaust denier conference? They are a lot of things, but they are not nihilists. The next line I always hear is, oh, but they could pass it off to Lebanese Hezbollah or HAMAS. Okay, and that changes the scenario how, exactly? As if it won’t possibly kill a lot of Palestinians, or as if we wouldn’t figure out it came from them. Since the Iran-Iraq War, Iran also has had chemical and biological stores and weapon capability, yet has never used them or passed them on to its proxies. As to the common refrain that the US is moving in to invade Iran. Not gonna happen. Pick up a topographical map of Iran sometime. Look up their population. I don’t even need to address the counterproductive affect it would have in unifying the country. And a strike? I remain unconvinced Israel even has the technology, whether with Jericho II payload and accuracy or F-15I’s to perform sustained strikes of numerous heavily fortified targets. Plus, as Gary Sick has observed,

When Israel keeps talking  practically every day of attacking  Iran,  to me, that  is the best evidence that they are not going to do it.  If you look back at almost all the raids and operations they have carried out whether in was in Entebbe, in Syria or in 1982, on Iraq’s nuclear facilities, all of those took place without absolutely any previous warning.  It was maintained as a great state secret.

My main problem with the hue and cry over the nuclear issue and saber rattling is that it overshadows the human rights issue. In Maziar Bahari’s article cited at the top of this page, he pointed out something very interesting, which I had been at a loss to contextualize in my last piece:

The rumor du jour in Iran is that Obama and the Guards are reaching a deal to normalize relations, in exchange for which America will ignore human rights abuses in Iran. Hence, the opposition movement’s slogan “Obama, either with them or with us.”

And you know what? We kind of do have a deal with them and firebrands like Ahmadinejad (or the ‘Persian Palin’, as I like to call him). Every time they crack down on opposition voices, all they have to do is shout a nuclear threat and — ooh, shiny ball — yes it’s that easy. We’re totally trained. Ask yourself a question. What domestically do you think they’d rather the focus from the international community be about?

In closing, I’d like to confess that Iranian politics still bewilders me, and I am still struggling with the Kabuki theater and Byzantine structure of it all. Robin Zaehner, an intelligence officer (and brilliant linguist and religious scholar still noted for his work in the field of Zoroastrianism) was stationed in Tehran during the efforts to undermine and overthrow Mossadegh. It was reported that he would tell newcomers when they asked about Iranian politics to read Lewis Carroll’s Through The Looking Glass. Nice to see some things don’t change. This is one of those characteristics I attribute to a very deeply ingrained culture. One in which every person is a political party unto themselves, and in which words can often have double, if not more meanings.

* A note, Student Day, 16 Azar, December 7th is coming up, and more demonstrations are expected. Preemptive arrests have already been made. In the meantime, enjoy a gallery of what the Green Movement has done to Iranian bank notes.